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RECONSTRUCTING FAULT: THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL 
TORTS 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles* 
The advent of no-fault divorce is nearly fifty years in the making, and 
despite broad intellectual support for the principle of no-fault, fault is 
persistently a factor in divorce in many jurisdictions and in the arena 
of public and scholarly opinion.  Feminists too have been struggling 
with this issue for decades, but the controversy persists.  This Article 
attempts to decode and resolve some of the tension between advocates 
of the relevance of fault and those who simply cannot believe that no-
fault divorce has not ended the fault discussion.  This Article focuses 
on the plight of caregivers and dependents, which should be the focus 
of any divorce regulation, and argues that fault divorce is not 
appropriate no matter which side of the sameness/difference debate 
one focuses upon.  Fault in divorce disproportionately punishes 
dependents and does not work hard enough to protect children from 
the many potential harms resulting from the dissolution of the 
marriage.  Instead, spousal torts are the appropriate exclusive domain 
for contending with wrongdoing during marriage and the role of 
spousal torts should be solidified and clarified so as to provide a clear 
outlet for marital wrongdoing.  Spousal torts appropriately provide 
redress for wrongs between spouses that are recoverable as between 
strangers and thereby protect the vulnerable in the domestic sphere.  
Moreover, confining litigation of marital wrongs within tort law 
provides a narrower and more judiciable means of contending with 
serious marital wrongs that appropriately reflects contemporary 
norms, protects caregivers and children in need of financial support 
and more fairly compensates the victim.  The transfer of fault 
litigation from divorce to torts, while often criticized as simply 
transferring the acrimony from one forum to another, has distinct 
theoretical and practical advantages and can preserve what seems 
inescapably relevant in fault divorce while benefiting from advantages 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fault in divorce is a curious issue.  On the one hand, no-fault divorce 
has forcefully revamped the divorce system in all but a very few 
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jurisdictions.1  On the other hand, fault or blameworthy conduct is 
persistently relevant, whether as an option in divorce statutes, as a 
bargaining mechanism, or to gain advantage in financial and custodial 
matters.2  Despite the broad intellectual acceptance of the advantages of 
no-fault divorce for parents and children, there is persistent belief that 
wrongdoing that has caused or, at the least was a part of, the breakdown 
of the marriage should be relevant in the law of divorce.  In that regard, 
the divorce process has witnessed the amazing resilience of blame.  
Eliminate the bitterness and fighting over the cause of the marital 
breakdown from one area of divorce law and the blame and acrimony 
pop up elsewhere—property disputes, alimony, or custody.3  Despite 
decades of exploration and contemplation, divorce law and scholars who 
study divorce law are still mired in the tension between fault and no-
fault without a clear resolution.4 
Feminists too have mixed feelings about fault divorce.  Although not 
originally the product of a deliberately feminist enterprise, no-fault 
divorce was endorsed by liberal feminists who applauded the potential 
of no-fault divorce to further the goal of gender neutrality.5  Having to 
prove grounds in order to obtain a divorce was traditionally mired with 
rigid hierarchical notions of male and female gender roles, and divorce 
 1. See, e.g., JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 237–38 (2005).  
Despite the presence of a no-fault option in all fifty states, fault divorce is still dominant in those 
jurisdictions—currently only three states—that only provide for a consensual no-fault option.  See infra 
Part II.A. 
 2. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
79, 100–102 (1991); see also infra Part II.A. 
 3. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 100–102; see generally ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992); Alan H. Frank, 
John J. Berman, & Stanley F. Mazur-Hart, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Rate: The Nebraska 
Experience—An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commentary, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (1978) 
(“Since fighting over who caused the breakup is futile, ‘those who want a fight, now use collateral issues 
as the battle ground.’  Fights over custody and support are far more prevalent and are often just as 
acrimonious and humiliating as those over grounds, if not more so.” (quoting comment of judge in 
Judges’ Questionnaire on Nebraska’s Dissolution of Marriage Law (November 1977) (results on file 
with Alan Frank, College of Law, University of Nebraska)); see also Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289–
91 (1975); see, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 cmt. b at 182, § 2.09(2)–(3) (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] 
(discussing how adversarial custody disputes can become regarding which parent will be best custodian 
and thus recommending a more definitive standard). 
 4. For recent discussions still struggling with the topic, see Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs 
Committed During Marriage: The Child that No Area of the Law Wants, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465 
(2009), Harry Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault Torts to Re-Emerge in the Guise of 
Torts, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1362–63 (2003), and Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 
57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1303 (2008). 
 5. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and its 
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1987) (describing in detail the advent of no-fault divorce). 
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has too often been awarded in a discriminatory fashion.6  Moreover, 
feminists aspiring to formal equality and fighting women’s traditional 
dependence on men have supported allowing either party to a marriage 
to exit if they so choose without having to prove or contrive the 
existence of fault.  Such independence and autonomy for women and 
men conforms with liberal feminists’ regard for the power of choice.7  
Other feminists, Lenore Weitzman primary among them,8 are more 
sensitive to the effect divorce has had on women’s lives, and argue that 
taking grounds out of divorce and assuming women’s equal status at the 
time of divorce may undermine women’s bargaining power and sacrifice 
their ability to obtain needed financial support.9  Others look to 
 6. See Jana Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1110–11 
(1989). 
 7. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1461, 
1474 (1992); ROBERT E. BURGER, THE LOVE CONTRACT: HANDBOOK FOR A LIBERATED MARRIAGE 
(1973); Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 
17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 155 (1996). 
 8. Lenore Weitzman has published the best-known work on the economic consequences of the 
new divorce laws for women and children.  Her study of no-fault divorce in California found that 
“divorced men experience[d] an average 42 percent rise in their standard of living in the first year after 
the divorce, while divorced women (and their children) experience[d] a 73 percent decline.”  LENORE J. 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
IN AMERICA 323 (1985).  Several scholars have challenged Weitzman’s methodology and her specific 
findings.  See, e.g., Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of 
Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641, 641 (1988); Richard R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic 
Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 529–35 (1996).  A number of studies, however, 
confirm that modern divorce laws have been economically devastating for many women and children.  
See, e.g., Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Montgomery County, 
Maryland, 22 FAM. L.Q. 225, 284 chart 6 (1988) (finding that in contested divorce adjudications where 
the women were awarded alimony the mean per capita income of the women fell 37% after divorce, the 
income of their children fell 61%, and the income of their former husbands increased 55%); Greg J. 
Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 
22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 488 (1985) (reporting that in the first year after divorce or separation “the family 
income of women who do not remarry is 70 percent of its previous figure; five years after a divorce or 
separation, the ratio for those still unmarried is 71 percent”); Barbara R. Rowe & Jean M. Lown, The 
Economics of Divorce and Remarriage for Rural Utah Families, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 301, 324–25 (1990) 
(reporting that “the divorced men in this study experienced a 73 percent increase in their standard of 
living while divorced women experienced a 32 percent decrease”); Heather Ruth Wishik, Economics of 
Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q. 79, 98 tbl.15 (1986) (reporting that, even assuming that all 
support orders were paid, women’s mean per capita income after divorce declined by 33%, children’s 
declined by 25%, and men’s rose by 120%).  Even more modern accounts of the effects of divorce, 
agree that there is a disparity between custodial women’s standard of living after marriage and their 
spouse’s.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY 
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 118 (2003).  Others argue that it is not no-
fault but rules regarding alimony and property distribution that are causing women and children to suffer 
after divorce.  See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing 
Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 90–100 (Stephan D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay 
eds., 1990). 
 9. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the 
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191 
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increased divorce rates and the failure of modern divorce regulations to 
fairly compensate women for their time out of the market as the cause of 
women’s ills, but still believe that unilateral no-fault divorce increases 
divorce rates.10  Those concerned with the effect of no-fault divorce on 
women and children question no-fault divorce—which makes scholars 
concerned with the plight of women post-divorce uneasy bedfellows 
with social conservatives who long for a return to traditional values that 
sanctified life-long marriage regardless of dissatisfaction.  Feminists are 
just as caught in the puzzle of fault as society at large: on the one hand 
they seek equal treatment, and on the other they are trying to protect 
women who are suffering under modern divorce laws. 
This Article offers a pragmatic11 resolution to the feminist dilemma 
while seeking to relieve tension in the broader “fault conundrum.”12  It 
proposes abandoning fault in divorce, but provides a clear framework in 
tort law for litigating physical abuse and extraordinary and outrageous 
conduct that causes severe distress between spouses.  The transfer of 
fault litigation from divorce to torts, while often criticized as simply 
transferring the acrimony from one forum to another,13 has distinct 
theoretical and practical advantages, which can preserve what seems 
inescapably relevant in fault divorce while benefiting from the 
advantages of no-fault divorce. 
Despite bargaining power advantages that accrue to some women, 
feminists, who are concerned with the effect no-fault divorce has on 
(Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1980); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 825, 866–70 (2004) (“The prohibition on interspousal contracts for domestic labor and 
the doctrine of necessaries help insure that many married women acquire few separate assets during 
marriage, while performing labor that diminishes their future earning potential in the market.  In light of 
this legal and economic background, divorce laws that assume that spouses have equal bargaining power 
in marriage and equal earning power after divorce may frequently be insufficient to keep many divorced 
women and their children out of poverty.”); Martha Fineman, Implemeting Equality: Ideology, 
Contradiction and Social Change, A Study in Rhetoric and Response in Regulation of the Consequences 
of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse with comments by Katherine T. 
Bartlett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L. J. 2525, 2532 
(1994); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don’t Let Divorce off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 14LI. 
 10. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 2, at 116–19; Thomas Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault 
Requirement, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 543 (1989) (no-fault laws “have a significant impact on divorce 
rates”). 
 11. Margaret Radin is the innovator of the concept of the pragmatic feminist.  See, e.g., Margaret 
Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1699, 1701, 1704–08 (1990).  
This Article adopts a perspective in the tradition of Radin’s emphasis on dealing with the realities of 
women’s situations and the effect laws have on women’s lives.  Radin recommends a context specific 
approach to feminist analysis that considers the practical effects of feminist reforms as opposed to a 
theoretical construct that can be applied in any situation. 
 12. The term “divorce conundrum” was coined by Lynn Wardle.  See Wardle, supra note 2. 
 13. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 4, at 1364; Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538–39.  See also 
infra Part III.C for responses to criticism of spousal torts. 
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women and children, should still opt to abandon fault in divorce because 
punishing bad behavior in the divorce process disproportionately 
punishes child caregivers, who are usually women14 and whose well-
being significantly affects the well-being of children.15  Caregivers in 
this context are parents who opt out of market work to some extent—by 
not working at all,16 by working part-time,17 by selecting a job that only 
 14. According to the 2008 Census Bureau, Household Data, Annual Averages, Presence at Work 
– Full and Part Time Status, mothers of children under six are in the labor force at a rate of 59%, and 
mothers with children under eighteen at a rate of 68%.  The November 2004 U.S. Bureau of Statistics 
Report, American Families and Living Arrangements, indicates that approximately 30% of mothers with 
children under eighteen stay out of the workforce full-time to care for children, compared with 
approximately 5% of fathers.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Families and Living Arrangements, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2010); see also 
Kemba J. Dunham, Stay-at-Home Dads Fight Stigma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at B1 (“According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s March 2002 Current Population Survey, among two-parent households, there 
were 189,000 children with stay-at-home dads [compared with] 11 million children with stay-at-home 
moms . . . .”); Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of 
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 19–31 (2000); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a 
New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2227, 2236 (1994) (“The dominant family ecology has three basic 
elements: the gendered structure of wage labor, a gendered sense of the extent to which child care can be 
delegated, and gender pressures on men to structure their identities around work.”); BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2003 tbl.4 (2004).  
Even after work, research shows that mothers do a lot more caregiving than dads.  See ARLIE 
HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT 
HOME 6 (1989) (documenting the phenomena of the second-shift wherein working mothers retain 
significant domestic labors: “The women [] interviewed seemed to be far more deeply torn between the 
demands of work and family than their husbands . . . . They felt the second shift was their issue and most 
of their husbands agreed.”). 
 15. Because ensuring the financial stability of caregivers is in the best interests of the children 
for whom caregivers care, by extension the focus on caregivers is directly to the benefit of children.  See 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caregiver 
Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 47–50 (2008). 
 16. Although clearly becoming less common, this phenomenon still exists.  Only 59% of women 
with children under six are in the labor market; 68% of women with children under eighteen are in the 
labor market.  That still leaves many women who leave the labor market altogether when their children 
are young.  Men are also leaving the job market to care for children, in increasing, but still marginal 
numbers.  See Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Married Mothers in the Labor Force: Trends in Labor 
Force Participation in Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Feb. 2007, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf.  On average, both the husband and wife work in only 
54.1% of married couples.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT OF MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILIES WITH 
BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE LABOR FORCE: 2008 (2008). 
 17. Persons are included as employed in labor statistics and part of the labor force even if they 
are employed fewer than thirty-five hours per week.  According to the 2008 Census Bureau, Household 
Data, Annual Averages, Presence at Work – Full and Part Time Status, mothers of children under six 
appear to be in the labor force at a rate of 59%—leaving 41% unemployed entirely—although that 
number does not account for the subset of women working part-time—less than thirty-five hours—and 
thereby sacrifice earning potential to be with children.  According to The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
released in February 2007, Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants, 60.2% 
of women with children under three are in the labor force, 29.4% of those women work part-time.  
About 68% of mothers with children under eighteen are in the workforce and 24.3% of those women are 
working part-time.  Women Leaving and Re-entering the Workforce, EMPLOYMOMS, June, 2009, 
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demands forty hours per week or fewer,18 by working from home, or by 
otherwise getting caught in the mommy–track long term or 
temporarily—in order to care for their children.  Therefore, caregivers 
earn a reduced or limited market wage and become wholly or partially 
financially dependent on their spouses and attached to the children for 
whom they care.19  Notwithstanding the reality that many female and 
male primary caretakers within a marriage have become significant 
contributors to family income, for the most part, primary caretakers, 
who are usually women, still contribute and work significantly less than 
their spouses.20  The same is logically true for men who take on the role 
of primary caretakers.  Since considering fault can be used to reduce 
needed financial support and can even affect custody,21 caregivers and 
their dependents are disproportionately affected by fault because they 
are more sensitive to the loss of support and custody.  As a result, 
caregivers, who may have acted badly in a moral sense (i.e., by 
committing adultery, being incorrigible to their spouses, or being 
bullies) but are still good mothers or fathers are disproportionately 
subject to punishment in the divorce process. 
Caregiving is an essential and undervalued gender role,22 and the law 
http://www.employmoms.com/node/83.  See also PEW RES. CTR., FROM 1997–2007: FEWER MOTHERS 
PREFER FULL-TIME WORK (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/ 
WomenWorking.pdf (describing how over the past decade, full-time work outside of the home has lost 
its appeal to working moms); DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: 
MOTHERHOOD, MARRIAGE AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 146–48 (1996) (indicating 
that only 28 percent of women with young children work full-time outside of the home, while an 
additional 40 percent work from home and/or part-time); Joan Williams, “It’s Snowing Down South”: 
How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 
828 (2002) (“Today, two out of three mothers are employed less than forty hours a week during the key 
years of career advancement and eighty-five percent of women become mothers.”); Robert Pear, 
Married and Single Parents Spending More Time with Children, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2006, at A1 (documenting an increase in time spent by both parents with children and a decrease in time 
spent doing housework, but indicating that women still do twice as much housework and child work 
than men, as women average twenty-three hours of paid work per week, thirteen hours of child care and 
nineteen hours of house work, whereas men average thirty-seven hours of paid work per week). 
 18. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 1–9 (2002) (93% of mothers work forty-nine hours per week or less).  The U.S. 
Census Bureau provides statistics indicating that full-time work is thirty-five hours per week.  Many of 
the better paying jobs, however, demand many more hours—more than even forty hours per week.  See 
supra note 17. 
 19. See infra Part II.C.2; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 2; Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce 
Liability Without Fairness: Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 58–59 (1991); 
Donald R. Williams, Women’s Part-Time Employment: A Gross Flows Analysis, MONTHLY LABOR 
REV., Apr. 1995, at 36 (most married mothers still work primarily part-time). 
 20. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. Although the focus on caregivers in this Article is gender neutral, it is still a gendered 
feminist perspective because caregivers are usually female and because the disadvantaged role that 
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must focus on the effects it is having on this vital institution.23  The 
plight of caregivers and the children for whom they care should be the 
focus of modern divorce law.24  Therefore, the goals of divorce law 
should not be punishing bad behavior, potentially leaving good 
caregivers and their children in financial ruin, but rather should focus on 
shepherding families through the process of divorce with as much 
financial and emotional stability as possible so that the parties can 
separate their lives and work together for the betterment of the children 
of the marriage.25 
On the other hand, it is a palpable injustice to ignore certain extreme 
wrongdoing between spouses.  When wrongdoing is not only “fault” but 
physical abuse or extraordinary and outrageous emotional abuse causing 
severe distress, the legal system must provide an outlet for adjudicating 
caregivers find themselves in has evolved in the context of the gendered nature of that caregiver role.  
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURCES ON LIFE AND LAW 73 (1987) (“A few 
husbands are like most wives—financially dependent on their spouse.  It is also true that a few fathers, 
like most mothers are primary parents . . . . My point though is that occupying those particular positions 
is consistent with the norms for gender female.  To be poor, financially dependent, and a primary parent 
constitutes part of what being a woman means.  Most of those who are in those circumstances are 
women.”); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 179 
(2004).  This Article focuses on and argues on behalf of the institution of caregiving.  Although the 
Article points out that woman are usually the caregivers, it does not seek to reinforce outdated 
stereotypes, nor does it attempt to encourage or force women, as opposed to men, to undertake 
caregiving roles. 
 23. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 4–6, 32–39; see also Anne Laquer Estin, Maintenance, 
Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 787–802 (1993); Laura T. Kessler, 
The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of 
Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (arguing that the importance of 
caregiving should be considered in shaping and interpreting the law of employment discrimination); 
Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 61 (2002) (“‘We need to elevate care to 
this level of importance [a core value] for the basic reason that it is essential to human health and 
balanced development.’” (quoting MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW 
FAMILY POLITICS 48–49 (1999))); Lucinda Findley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the 
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1176 (1986) (“Employers should bear 
the costs of [childbearing] responsibilities because childbearing and rearing are crucially important 
social functions that are connected to and have major impacts on the work world.”).  But see Katherine 
M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 186–87, 
208 (2001) (arguing that children are not, in fact, a public good, but rather a personal choice and that 
population can be replenished by immigration).  For a poignant critique of Franke’s argument, see 
Becker, supra, at 73–75. 
 24. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 25. Because this article focuses on the effects of divorce on caregivers and dependents, the 
arguments are aimed at married couples with children, and approximately 70% of married couples have 
children.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSE AND FAMILY STRUCTURE: HOUSEHOLD TYPE 1999–2000 
(2000); infra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.  For married couples without children, no-fault 
divorce does not carry the great burden of contending with dependency and children which are the 
leading indicator of causes of poverty and thus the no-fault dilemma is not pressing.  See, e.g., WARREN 
& TYAGI, supra note 8, at 6–7.  For unmarried couples with children, divorce law does not apply and is 
thus beyond the scope of this Article. 
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such harms.26  When such abuse occurs, punishment and even financial 
ruin may be warranted, regardless of the caregiving activity of whoever 
inflicted the abuse.27  Despite the end of spousal immunities, such 
litigation is still rare for physical abuse and is not widely accepted for 
emotional abuse.28  Moreover, spousal torts are heavily criticized by 
scholars for simply transferring the acrimony and creating more 
intrusive litigation.29  Yet, ignoring such abuse in the domestic sphere 
discriminates against women, who as a matter of statistics spend more 
time in the home and are more vulnerable to abuse in the home.  
Moreover, entering the domain of torts establishes a deliberately higher 
bar for punishing wrongdoers, thereby preserving financial loss for 
extraordinary wrongdoing.  Indeed, the notion of “extraordinary and 
outrageous conduct” in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress should be used in the marital context to distinguish between bad 
behavior that should not cause financial suffering for caregivers and 
children in the divorce process and tortious conduct that justifies 
significant pecuniary compensation. 
This argument against fault in divorce and for legitimizing a role for 
spousal torts resolves the tension between feminists concerned with 
recognizing and supporting the reality of women’s lives30 and liberal 
feminists looking for gender neutral laws.31  According to this argument, 
no-fault divorce should be preferred from the perspective of gender 
neutrality or difference feminism, particularly for cultural feminists 
focused on the importance of caregiving.  Torts should be available for 
spouses in a manner equivalent to their availability for strangers, thereby 
satisfying liberal feminists’ quest for equality and relational feminists’ 
 26. The terms “extraordinary and outrageous” behavior and “severe” distress are used in order to 
signal the reference to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).  See infra Part 
III.A.1 for case cites and discussion of this tort. 
 27. Primary caregivers should be awarded a presumption of custody.  However, when serious 
physical and emotional abuse has been carried out, even loss of custody to the primary caregiver during 
the marriage may be warranted or at least may need to be considered and the custodial presumption 
rebutted in the best interests of the children.  See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 47; see also infra 
notes 286–294 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra Part III.A. 
 29. See infra Part III.C. 
 30. For a sampling of formal neutrality feminists focused on gender neutral law, see Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus 
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949). 
 31. For a sampling of the perspective of difference feminists, see Mary Becker, Patriarchy and 
Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 41–42 (1999); Christine 
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1295–300; 1304–08 (1987); CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1993); 
Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist 
Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 87 (1987). 
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desire to protect women’s different lives. 
In addition, this solution provides a clear, albeit limited outlet for the 
harshest feelings between spouses that develop because of physical 
abuse and for extraordinary and outrageous emotional abuse.  This 
should provide satisfaction to those who persist in attributing legal 
relevance, at least with regards to financial consequences, to bad 
behavior that causes or surrounds divorce.  Thus, although fault in 
divorce and spousal torts are clearly separate inquiries, this Article links 
the two in an essential manner because it points to an alternate and better 
outlet for dealing with the harshest behavior between spouses.  At the 
same time, spousal torts should be separated to the extent possible from 
the divorce process so as to preserve divorce for dealing with separating 
families as well as providing financial and emotional stability for parents 
and children.  Torts cannot and should not contend with all, or even 
most, of the bitterness that is associated with divorce—such mutual 
recrimination is not judiciable, nor does punishing bad behavior in the 
courtroom serve the interests of families.32  However, spousal torts do 
provide legal recourse where such recourse would be warranted as 
between non-spouses and that much is fundamental to providing a just 
and non-discriminatory legal system. 
This Article’s argument has two parts.  Part II assesses contending 
with wrongdoing between spouses in the context of divorce law, and 
Part III assesses the alternative of spousal torts.  Part II is structured in 
three subparts.  First, in order to facilitate this assessment of fault in 
divorce, subpart A discusses the current role that fault plays in the 
divorce process.  In particular, it examines unilateral versus consensual 
divorce, fault-regarding as opposed to fault-driven and fault-blind 
divorce, and the role of complicity in divorce. 
Next, subpart B considers the appropriate goals of modern divorce 
law in light of contemporary norms in order to assess fault in divorce.  
The best justification for divorce regulations in light of the more 
individualistic and equal society in which we currently live is the 
protection of dependent children and their caregivers as opposed to more 
traditional rigid regulations focused on preventing divorce.  That subpart 
also considers arguments that divorce law should attribute blame as a 
reflection of the acrimonious and often blameworthy nature of the 
marital breakdown.  In actuality, attributing blame to a winner and a 
loser in a divorce process does not reflect the mutual blame, regret, and 
breakdown of trust that is a regular part of most divorces. 
Subpart C then considers the way in which taking fault out of divorce 
 32. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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affects the plight of children and caregivers.  This subpart considers the 
argument that taking fault out of divorce hurts women because it 
undermines the bargaining power needed to obtain vital financial 
support.  This Article argues, however, that punishing wrongdoers for 
their role in causing the breakdown of the marriage disproportionately 
affects women in divorce because caregivers have more to lose from 
financial and custodial sanctions than market earners, who take their 
earning potential with them after divorce.  This subpart next considers 
whether taking fault out of divorce would hurt children because it eases 
the divorce process and harms the sanctity of marriage; therefore, 
potentially causing an increase in divorce or a decline in marriage, 
which can be harmful to children.  This Article concludes that the 
evidence does not reliably support these hypotheses. 
Part III, which makes the case for tort law as an alternative outlet for 
contending with wrongdoing by spouses during marriage, is divided into 
three subsections.  First, it provides an outline of the modern 
jurisprudence of spousal torts.  It describes the contemporary legal 
recourse available for wrongdoing between spouses in the realm of torts.  
It then provides rationales as to why spousal torts are so rarely brought 
and are even more rarely successful.  In particular, it focuses on the 
problems of overlap between fault in divorce and spousal torts as well as 
the need to define an exclusive outlet for marital wrongs.  Finally, it 
reorients marital wrongs in the context of spousal torts, describing harms 
for which spouses could recover damages and those for which they 
could not. 
Second, Part III makes the case for spousal torts by espousing three 
significant benefits of spousal torts as the exclusive arena for litigating 
marital wrongdoing.  It explores the imperative for providing spousal 
torts in order to ensure recourse for those who suffer domestic harms 
amounting to extraordinary, abusive, or criminal behavior, just as torts 
provide such recourse for such harm to all other people.  Any alternative 
is discriminatory against the interests of women, who are more 
vulnerable to domestic abuse.  Moreover, transferring the punishment of 
wrongdoing between spouses to the torts context modernizes the 
litigation of marital wrongs in light of contemporary norms.  A narrower 
and more heightened realm of judiciable wrongs conforms to modern 
perceptions of the appropriate realm of litigation between spouses, 
protects caregivers and children unless serious extraordinary 
wrongdoing is involved, and more fairly compensates victims of abuse.  
Finally, contending with marital wrongs in torts harnesses the gender 
neutral power of torts in pursuit of harms most often suffered by women. 
The third subsection of Part III addresses four critiques of spousal 
11
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torts: (1) they are too intimate for objective and identification; (2) they 
will only increase acrimony between divorcing spouses; (3) they ignore 
complex co-dependent participation in abusive behavior by marital 
partners; and (4) they are too costly. 
II. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF FAULT IN DIVORCE 
This Article assesses the role of fault in divorce in three steps.  First, 
it outlines the role of fault in contemporary divorce law.  Next, it 
considers the appropriate purposes of divorce law in order to create a 
framework for assessing fault in divorce.  Finally, it discusses the role of 
fault in divorce in light of the proper purposes developed—namely, the 
protection of caregivers and children. 
A. The Role of Fault in Modern Divorce Law 
In order to set the stage for assessing the role of fault in divorce, this 
subpart explores contemporary divorce law, focusing on the relevance of 
fault.  It discusses the advent of unilateral divorce and the distinction 
between unilateral and consensual no-fault divorce, and points to distinct 
ways of integrating fault in divorce: fault-blind divorce, fault-regarding 
divorce and fault-driven divorce.  Finally, this subpart analyzes the role 
of complicity in the movement from fault-driven to fault-regarding and 
fault-blind divorce. 
1. No-Fault Divorce Versus Unilateral Divorce 
The right to obtain a divorce no longer must be won based on proving 
“grounds”—blameworthy behavior of one’s spouse.33  In all fifty states, 
a marriage can be terminated without proving either spouse’s guilt or 
innocence.34  The no-fault divorce revolution surfaced in the United 
States when a 1966 California Governor’s Commission issued a 
recommendation that the sole grounds for divorce in that state should be 
an “irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage or insanity.35  In 1970 this 
 33. For a discussion of traditional fault divorce, see Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: 
Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000); Herma Hill Kay, From the 
Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States 
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2019 (2000). 
 34. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Commentary, The Ali Principles: A Farewell to Fault—But 
What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 213, 213–16 (2001); see also Linda Elrod & Robert Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law, 
33 FAM. L.Q. 865, 911 (2000). 
 35. Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291, 
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recommendation became law in California.36  The concept of no-fault 
divorce then spread eastward, strengthened by its endorsement in the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).37  Laws that are referred 
to as “no-fault” divorce laws do not always maintain the original 
“irretrievable breakdown” language of the California’s law.  Rather the 
term “no-fault” refers to any grounds for divorce that do not require one 
party to find fault with the other in order to obtain a divorce, including 
divorce on the basis of separation for a designated amount of time.38  A 
primary goal of no-fault reform was to eliminate the perjury, complicity, 
and adversity that were rampant in the fault system for obtaining 
divorce.39  Moreover, the belief was that the reform would better serve 
to preserve those marriages that had not “broken down,” while allowing 
troubled marriages to dissolve.40  The original no-fault reformers 
envisioned that fact-finding would be necessary to determine whether 
the breakdown of the marriage had occurred, and that, absent such a 
finding, a divorce would not be granted.41  If one party were to maintain 
that the marriage was not broken and provide evidence of its continued 
functionality, this would be evidence towards a finding that the marriage 
should not be ended by divorce.42  Indeed, the drafting of original no-
fault statutes demonstrates that the lack of spousal agreement to the 
breakdown of the marriage would be cause for temporarily or 
permanently delaying the divorce.43 
Nonetheless, modern divorce law, with only a few exceptions,44 has 
300 (1987); Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966); 
Charles W. Tenney, Jr., Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24 (1967). 
 36. See Kay, supra note 35, at 291, 291 n.2. 
 37. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT, 9 U.L.A. 91 (1979). 
 38. No-fault laws variously focus on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, see, for 
example, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(13) (West 2010), incompatibility/insupportability, see, for example, 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (West 2010), or the de facto separation of the parties, see, for example, 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (West 2010) (separation for six months) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3(a) 
(West 2010) (separation for three years). 
 39. Kay, supra note 5, at 4.  See also Wardle, supra note 2 at 92–94; Evans, supra note 4, at 473; 
Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Should We? Could We?, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 317 (2008); 
infra Part II.A.3. 
 40. Kay, supra note 5, at 5. 
 41. See generally Wadlington, supra note 36. 
 42. Kay, supra note 5, at 36. 
 43. Id. at 36–39. 
 44. New York, Mississippi, and Tennessee require mutual consent with regard to no-fault 
divorces.  See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2010) (requiring both parties to sign a 
separation agreement, resolving all issues between them, including property distribution, custody and 
support payments); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2(1) (2009) (a divorce “may be granted on the ground of 
irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint complaint of the husband and wife”); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (2010) (“[T]he parties [must] have made adequate and sufficient provision by 
written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the equitable 
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gone even further in easing access to divorce.  Modern divorce law is 
not only no-fault, it is also unilateral.45  In addition to not having to 
prove grounds, either spouse can obtain a divorce without the other’s 
consent.  While only one state officially allows for unilateral divorce by 
statute,46 the vast majority of other states allow unilateral divorce after 
predetermined waiting periods or by finding that the marriage is 
irretrievably broken if one party deems it so.47  Courts are not apt to 
probe extensively into the facts of the parties’ relationship to determine 
how broken a marriage is if one party expressly wants to terminate the 
marriage.48  This was not an intended consequence of the original no-
fault reform.49  In fact, early critics of no-fault divorce forecasted this 
slip into unilateral divorce.50  Yet, unilateral divorce is a fundamental 
part of the trend toward easier access to divorce and the modern societal 
distaste for keeping a party trapped in an unwanted marriage.  It is part 
of the modern focus on the benefits of autonomy in family law—as 
opposed to the traditional emphasis on obligation, status, structure, and 
regulations.51 
Many jurisdictions maintain both fault and no-fault grounds for 
divorce.  As of November 2004, fourteen states and the District of 
Columbia had statutes allowing only for no-fault divorce, while thirty-
three states provided a choice.52  Given that divorce is available 
unilaterally without grounds, however, the question remains as to why 
married couples would use fault grounds for divorce (other than in the 
three states that require mutual consent).53  There are a few reasons, but 
settlement of any property rights between the parties.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Elayne Carol Berg, Note, Irreconcilable Differences: California Courts Respond to 
No Fault Dissolutions, 7 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453 (1974); Niko Matouschek & Imran Rosul, The 
Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence, 51 J.L. & ECON. 59, 62 (2008); Garrison, 
supra note 39, at 317. 
 46. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.030 (2010). 
 47. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01(J) (West 2011) (providing for divorce “[o]n the 
application of either party, when husband and wife have, without interruption for one year, lived 
separate and apart without cohabitation”); see Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart, supra note 3, at 66–67. 
 48. See Stephen L. Sass, The Iowa No Fault Dissolution of Marriage Law in Action, 18 S.D. L. 
REV. 629, 650 (1973); In re Marriage of Collins, 200 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 1972); J. Herbie Difonzo 
& Ruth Stern, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 
21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1, 21–22 (2008) (marriage is generally over if one spouse says it is). 
 49. Kay, supra note 5, at 4; REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON THE 
FAMILY (1966). 
 50. Sass, supra note 48, at 650; Frank, Berman, & Mazur-Hart, supra note 3, at 61–65. 
 51. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 52. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin provide only for no-fault divorce.  Kay, supra note 
5, at 5–6. 
 53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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admittedly none justify the use of grounds in most cases making no-fault 
divorces the statistical norm.54  First, grounds can eliminate delays that 
require parties to live separate for a certain amount of time55 under no-
fault laws.56  Second, where there is no settlement, a fault divorce may 
provide one party with an advantage in settling the financial incidents of 
divorce, although for states that consider fault with regard to property 
distribution, or alimony, fault grounds for obtaining the divorce are 
usually not a prerequisite for such consideration.57  A determination of 
fault may also make it easier for the innocent spouse to obtain custody.58  
While marital wrongdoing is not usually as directly relevant to custody 
disputes as it once was, courts still may consider marital wrongdoing in 
discussions of moral character and fitness.59  Finally, angry spouses 
 54. Nancy D. Polikoff, Valuing All Families: An Intro to the 2008 Santa Clara Law Review 
Symposium, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 741, 743 (2008); Marsha Garrison, The Decline of Formal 
Marriage: Inevitable or Reversible, 41 FAM. L.Q. 491, 508 (2008); Elisabeth S. Scott, Parental 
Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1087 (2003). 
 55. These amounts of time are usually between six months and one year, although in some 
jurisdictions it can be a requirement of up to three years. 
 56. Kyle v. Kyle, 475 S.E.2d 344, 355 (W. Va. 1996); Konefal v. Konefal, 446 S.E.2d 153, 154 
(Va. Ct. App. 1994); Rivette v. Rivette, 899 So.2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (grounds for divorce are 
present when spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least 180 days prior to the filing 
of the divorce, but since there was evidence of reconciliation in the 180 day period divorce could not be 
granted on these grounds); Prather v. Prather, 459 N.E.2d 234, 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (grounds for 
divorce are established if spouses live separate and apart for the statutorily required period of one year 
without cohabitation, even if they had intercourse one time during that year); Scott v. Scott, 586 A.2d 
1140, 1142 (Vt. 1990) (in order to obtain a divorce based on the grounds of living separate and apart the 
spouses must live separate and apart for the statutorily required six months, but this does not mean that 
the couple must live under separate roofs); Caccamise v. Caccamise, 747 A.2d 221, 229 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2000) (A decree of divorce may be based on voluntary separation if the parties voluntarily lived 
separate and apart without cohabitation for twelve months prior to filing for divorce, but because the 
wife left the husband and the separation was not mutually voluntary the divorce could not be granted on 
the grounds of living separate and apart.). 
 57. See Margaret Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No-Fault Laws and At Fault People, 18 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 325, 326–27 (1998).  But see, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 351 S.E.2d 37 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) 
(Decree based on one year’s separation reversed because trial court must consider wife’s claim for 
divorce based on husband’s desertion, since such grounds may be relevant in determining alimony.). 
 58. Patel v. Patel, 577 S.E.2d 587, 589 (Ga. 2003) (Upon a finding of fault in granting divorce, 
the party not at fault will be awarded custody unless evidence demonstrates that it is in the best interests 
of the child to be in the other parent’s custody.); Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 282 (Miss. 2004); 
Stonham v. Widiastuti, 79 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wyo. 2003); Pietrzak v. Schroeder, 759 N.W.2d 734, 744 
(S.D. 2009). 
 59. Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 412 (Miss. 2000) (holding that adulterous relationship can 
be considered when determining the moral fitness of a parent to raise a child); Anderson v. Anderson, 
386 So.2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (adultery can affect custody determinations if the adulterous 
relationship has a negative effect on the child); Chastain v. Chastain, 672 S.E.2d 108 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2009) (A parent’s morality is considered when it has an effect on the welfare of the child; flagrant 
promiscuity is immoral conduct that inevitably affects the child, but in this case, the wife’s affairs did 
not rise to the level of flagrant promiscuity.); Brinkley v. Brinkley, 336 S.E.2d 901, 902–03 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1985). 
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sometimes want the record to reflect their spouse’s wrongdoing merely 
as a record of the wrongdoing.60 
In sum, no-fault divorce has made way for an even more permissive 
system of unilateral divorce in most states.  Unilateral divorce reflects 
modern societal focus on autonomy.61  While fault is an option in 
unilateral divorce states, it is redundant in most instances.  On the other 
hand, when divorce must be consensual fault plays a much larger role in 
the divorce process. 
2. The Impact of Fault on the Incidents of Divorce 
The goals of the California Governor’s Commission were to eliminate 
grounds, and to “remove fault from other aspects of marital dissolution: 
from the award of spousal support, from the division of property, and 
from the child custody determination.”62  However, as the states have 
adopted no-fault grounds,63 state legislatures have varied in the extent to 
which they are willing to modify their existing provisions governing the 
relationship between grounds, the financial aspects of divorce, and 
issues of custody of marital children.64  Recently, fault has become 
much less prominent as a factor in determining alimony and property 
division in many states, but marital misconduct remains relevant in 
others.65  Twenty-five states include marital fault as a factor in alimony 
decisions.66  Thus, even after the no-fault revolution, where fault 
considerations influence financial matters, accusations of fault are not 
infrequently used as a means of gaining leverage over the other party in 
 60. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Beyond the Bounds of Decency: Why Fault Matters to 
(Some) Wronged Spouses, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 503, 506 (2009). 
 61. See Elisabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1901, 1944 (2000); infra Part II.B.1. 
 62. See Kay, supra note 5, at 5 (citing REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION 
ON THE FAMILY 1–2 (1966)). 
 63. Linda Elrod & Robert Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765, 807 
(1997); Ira Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1996). 
 64. See Kay, supra note 5, at 5–12; Ellman, supra note 63, at 775. 
 65. According to a survey by the American Law Institute, twenty states decide the financial 
consequences of dissolution without regard to marital misconduct; five disregard fault for property 
division and, as a practical matter, almost always do so for support; three almost never consider fault in 
financial matters although they could do so under their statutes; seven disregard fault for property 
division but consider it for spousal support awards; and fifteen states consider misconduct for both 
property division and alimony.  See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 1, topic 2 (2002); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, 
A Review of the Year in Family Law: Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and 
Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. L.Q. 607, 653 (listing twenty-three jurisdictions in which fault is not 
considered in alimony cases and thirty where it is relevant). 
 66. See Linda Rio, Charts, 38 FAM. L.Q. 809, 809 (2005). 
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terms of rights to marital property and spousal support.  All states 
determine custody according to the best interests of the child (or in one 
state by approximating custody before divorce),67 and do not use 
custody determinations to intentionally punish a spouse found to be at 
fault for ending the marriage.68  Yet, the details of the fault of one parent 
can be used in setting a presumption in determining custody or can be 
used in determining moral fitness, one factor in determining custodial 
rights in the best interests of the child,69 particularly if the nature of the 
fault can be shown to have caused harm to the child.70 
Accordingly, despite the common perception that fault divorce is 
largely antiquated, in an important respect, fault is very much relevant.  
There are really two different aspects of fault in divorce: (1) whether 
fault should limit access to divorce; and (2) whether fault should affect 
the incidents to divorce, particularly the financial incidents.71  In a 
comprehensive study, Brining and Buckley explain how the use of the 
term no-fault divorce to define only access to divorce is too simplistic, 
particularly when discussing how no-fault has affected rates of divorce, 
as fault affecting the incidents of divorce can also affect rates of 
divorce.72  Based on this distinction between access to divorce and the 
effect fault can have on the incidents of divorce, Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse designates three categories of state systems relating to fault: 
(1) “fault-blind;” (2) “fault-driven;” and (3) “fault-regarding.”73  While 
 67. One state approximates custody before divorce.  See W. VA. CODE § 48-1-210 (2010). 
 68. Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983) (holding that marital fault should 
not be used in custody determinations in order to punish the other spouse); Sumrall v. Sumrall, 970 
So.2d 254, 257 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (The court found that the primary consideration when determining 
custody of a child is the best interest of the child, not marital fault.). 
 69. See Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 282 (Miss. 2004) (Moral fitness of parents can be 
considered as one factor when determining the best interest of the child.); Stonham v. Widiastuti, 79 
P.3d 1188, 1193 (Wyo. 2003) (Wyoming Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 requires the court to consider nine 
specific factors when determining a child’s best interest including the relative competence and fitness of 
each parent.). 
 70. See Lynn Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation, 52 
CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 81–82 (2002).  This is particularly relevant in the case of domestic abuse where 
many states will weigh domestic abuse of the mother as a factor, or even as a presumption.  See, e.g., 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.13(b) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN 
§ 9:364 (2009); Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on 
Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1055–58 (1991); Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against 
Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109 
(1995).  Needless to say, abuse of the child is directly relevant and is not infrequently a per se factor.  
See, e.g., Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 826 (N.D. 1995); Krank v. Krank, 541 N.W.2d 714, 716 
(N.D. 1996); In re T.M.B., 491 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Neb. 1992); Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 273 (Conn. 
1993). 
 71. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1362–63. 
 72. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57. 
 73. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2532.  See also Ellman, supra note 63, at 778–84. 
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there are no longer any fault-driven states, all but the approximately 
twenty fault blind states are fault regarding when it comes to property 
distribution, alimony, or both.74  The vast majority of states that are 
fault-regarding simply treat fault only as one factor in determining 
financial incidents of divorce and not as a bar or an eligibility 
requirement.75  With regard to property distribution, most states are 
either fault-blind or have adopted limited fault-regarding approaches, in 
which only dissipation of income is considered, but a sizable minority, 
approximately one quarter, are fault-regarding.76  Considerations of fault 
are more common with regard to alimony, perhaps because of the 
historical context of the importance of fault in setting alimony,77 with 
about half the states allowing considerations of marital fault, including 
economic fault.78 
States also vary as to what they consider marital misconduct.79  For 
instance, financial misconduct is more often considered than other 
misconduct.80  States that consider misconduct other than financial 
wrongdoing consider a variety of conduct to constitute fault: adultery—
which is perhaps the most common and traditional81—cruelty, insanity, 
and desertion, among others.82  Considerations of fault have been 
difficult to remove entirely because people have strong emotional 
reactions to feeling wronged and want that reflected in the divorce 
process.83 
 74. See Ellman, supra note 63, at 778–84 (explaining that there are three possible ways to 
consider fault in setting the financial incidents of divorce: it can be an eligibility requirement (must 
prove fault in order to receive alimony), it may be a bar (cannot receive alimony if marital wrongdoing 
is demonstrated), or it may be a factor affecting in some circumstances the amount of alimony or 
property received).  North Carolina used to treat misconduct as a bar and as an eligibility requirement, 
but no longer does. 
 75. Id.; Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law 
from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243, 244–45 (2003); Ellman, supra note 63, at 786 
n.29. 
 76. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2534. 
 77. For a discussion of the historic relationship between alimony and fault, see infra note 299 
and accompanying text. 
 78. See Rio, supra note 66, at 809 chart 1. 
 79. See further discussion infra Part III.A.3; see also Ellman, supra note 63, at 777. 
 80. At least forty-one states authorize taking economic misconduct into account in dividing 
property at divorce.  See Rio, supra note 66, at 813 chart 5; see also Ellman, supra note 63, at 777. 
 81. See infra notes 241–251 and accompanying text. 
 82. Impotence and presumption of death are other fault grounds sometimes included in state 
laws.  See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204–08 (3d ed. 1985); 
Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV 605, 612 (1996) (listing fault grounds and giving a historical overview of their uses). 
 83. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 4, at 1363. 
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legal process or 
society.  
 
3. Complicity and Fraud in Divorce 
A substantial motivation for proponents of no-fault divorce was to 
avoid de-legitimization of the system of divorce as couples were actively 
circumventing the fault system.84  If both parties wanted a divorce, too 
often they contrived to ensure that the relationship warranted the divorce 
and collusion was not uncommon.85  Moreover, even without 
agreement, lawyers reported pressure to doctor evidence so that a 
divorce could be obtained.86  The abandonment of fault-driven divorce 
has undoubtedly opened the door to people stuck in troubled 
relationships to leave the marriage without having to stoop to 
disreputable practices.87  It is safe to assume that fraud has been reduced 
by the no-fault system and by allowing unilateral divorce.88  This seems 
a significant benefit to no-fault divorce.  This benefit applies to divorce 
upon mutual consent and to unilateral divorce where one party was so 
desperate to leave the marriage that he or she would engage in 
deception.  It is conventional wisdom that a return to a fault system of 
divorce would encourage perjury once again.89  The reality is that upon 
a return to a fault-driven system of divorce, couples would likely still 
divorce at the same rates, but their fraudulent behavior would be to the 
detriment of the legal system and to the financial detriment of the spouse 
who most wants to exit the marriage, and who therefore may need to 
sacrifice money or custody in order to secure complicity.90  As 
discussed below, penalizing this spouse, regardless of his or her identity 
or circumstances, is not always in the interests of the 
91
 84. Morse, Jr., supra note 82, at 612; Herbi DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter 
Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519 (1994); Wardle, supra note 2, at 137. 
 85. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 93. 
 86. Id. at 93. 
 87. Id. at 104; Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal 
Regulations, 42 FAM. L. Q. 309, 317 (2008). 
 88. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 104; see also Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the 
New York Anomaly, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1127–28 (1936) (reporting widespread belief that 
legislators, judges, other court personnel, lawyers, parties, and others colluded to concoct evidence in 
divorce cases to satisfy the requirements of New York’s fault-based law). 
 89. LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 285 
(1998). 
 90. As discussed below, although many have assumed that the spouse who wants to exit the 
marriage is usually the man, women more and more frequently are the parties who desire to leave the 
marriage.  Moreover, they are more often abused and thus need to leave the marriage more quickly.  
Women also have more to lose from the divorce process as they are usually more financially dependent 
on their spouses.  See infra Part II.C.2; see also Garrison, supra note 87, at 317–18. 
 91. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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B. The Purpose of Contemporary Divorce Regulations 
This subpart explores the proper role of regulation in contemporary 
divorce.  First, this subpart considers the changing social norms that 
have transformed the very nature of marriage and the corresponding 
social attitudes toward divorce, advocating divorce regulations that 
focus on dependents and their caregivers as opposed to status and 
obligation.  Next, this subsection examines the challenge made by some 
scholars, jurists, and legislators that ignoring wrongdoing leaves 
something fundamental out of the divorce process. 
1. Changing Nature of Marriage and Divorce 
A significant impetus for the move away from fault driven divorce is 
changing societal perceptions of the nature and the purpose of marriage 
as well as the changing role of women in society.92  By the 1960s and 
1970s, marriage had begun to transform from a social and economic 
necessity for integrating women into society and ensuring their 
livelihood to a source of personal satisfaction.93  As women entered the 
workforce, obtaining expanded potential for economic independence, 
and as their equal status to men solidified, marriage was no longer 
critical as a source of social stability and financial sustenance. Marriage 
has instead become a tool of fulfillment.94  While no-fault divorce was 
not a product of the women’s movement, certainly many feminists 
supported it based on the notion of equality and increased status of 
women it reflects.95  Contemporary individuals search for a marital 
partner with whom they can share a “deep emotional and spiritual 
connection” and with whom they “can communicate about [their] 
deepest feelings.”96  These high expectations inevitably lead to 
disappointment and dissatisfaction.  When expectations are not met, 
individuals feel a conviction that they should not be forced to remain in 
a relationship with someone with whom they do not have a bond of love, 
 92. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 95. 
 93. STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 203–04 (1988); PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: 
GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF UPHEAVAL 12 (1997). 
 94. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 33; John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, 
in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43–60 (1979). 
 95. Kay, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 96. BARBARA DAFOE WITEHEAD & DAVID POENOE, THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE 
STATE OF OUR UNIONS: WHO WANTS TO MARRY A SOUL MATE?: NEW SURVEY FINDINGS ON YOUNG 
ADULTS’ ATTITUDES ABOUT LOVE AND MARRIAGE 2 (2001). 
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regardless of fault.97  Modern marriage’s focus on personal fulfillment 
understandably sets the tone for demanding release when such 
fulfillment is not met.98 
The enhanced commitment to personal choice and private ordering in 
the law in the past few decades further propels the sense that marriage 
should be freely chosen and not used as a mechanism for entrapment.99  
Society has become more of an observer of intact marriages and is 
perceived as having less responsibility in ensuring the longevity and 
preservation of marriage when even one member of a couple no longer 
wishes to remain in the relationship.100  In light of the modern focus of 
marriage and emphasis on individual rights,101 both the prerequisites to 
entering marriage and the requisites to divorce have waned dramatically 
over the past several decades.102  State interests in keeping unloving 
couples in a marriage have weakened substantially and fault-driven 
divorce litigation centered on the possibility of denying divorce 
altogether has lost its cogency.  The question that remains is which 
rationale for state regulations of marriage and divorce remains 
compelling. 
While marriage’s transformation to an instrument of personal 
fulfillment has signaled a more complex vision of marriage than as the 
sole “instrumentality charged with civilization’s most burdensome, time-
consuming but indispensable task, the acculturation of children,”103 the 
latter task is still very much at the heart of marriage.  Approximately 
72% of marriages result in dependent children.104  Marriage is still 
 97. See Scott, supra note 61, at 1944. 
 98. The effect of law on culture and society, and of culture on law, is a matter of scholarly 
debate.  For its purposes of this Article assumes a complex transformative mutually coexistent 
relationship.  See Spaht, supra note 75, at 245; Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: 
Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1559–63 (1998). 
 99. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American Family 
Law, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 295 (1995); Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of the 
American Family, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1809–10 (1985); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 86 (2004) (arguing that “the availability of free exit 
through no-fault divorce” is “a bedrock liberal value” that “stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to 
engage; it is the ability to dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons”); Spaht, 
supra note 75, at 301–02. 
 100. Schneider, supra note 99, at 1809. 
 101. Scott, supra note 61, at 1944. 
 102. See generally Spaht, supra note 75, at 288–305. 
 103. See id. at 244–45; see also Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: 
Heterosexual, Same Sex— or Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 299 (2000). 
 104. Census 2000, analyzed by the Social Science Data Analysis Network, reports that 
approximately 28% of married couples did not have children. Census Scope, Household and Family 
Structure 1990–2000, http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_house.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010) 
(reviewing Census 2000).  The U.S. Bureau of Statistics issued a Report in November 2004 entitled 
“American Families and Living Arrangements” indicating that in 2003, 66% of married men from the 
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widely considered the ideal framework in which to provide financial and 
emotional stability to children.105  When children are raised by a married 
couple, one spouse usually compromises his potential for market 
earnings to some extent in order to care for those children.106  Those 
children and that spouse become dependent to some extent on the 
market earner for financial support both during that marriage and, often 
for some period of time, after a marriage ends in divorce.107  Despite the 
increasing presence of both spouses in the workplace,108 mothers are 
still primarily responsible for child care and, as a result, sacrifice market 
earning potential and must contend with dependency on their spouses 
more than fathers.109  Recognizing the value in raising children and the 
valuable service that caregivers provide110 necessitates protecting 
caregivers and the children for whom they care.111  And, statistics show, 
ages of twenty five to fifty-four had children under the age of eighteen and 63% of married women from 
the ages of twenty-five to fifty-four had children under the age of eighteen.  See U.S. Census Bureau, 
Families and Living Arrangements, http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2010).  Clearly a larger percentage of overall married persons have children as these 
percentages do not take into account married couples with children over eighteen.  See WILLIAMS, supra 
note 18, at 1–9. 
 105. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual 
Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 472 (1983) (“The 
objectives of a democratic society based on established patterns of marriage and kinship should not be 
terribly mysterious . . . . For instance, a stable environment is crucial to the developmental needs of 
children . . . .”); see also infra Part II.C.3. 
 106. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 5–7; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 18, at 64–81. 
 108. Mothers are undoubtedly increasingly in the work force.  See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 
17, at 152 (“In 1970, 44% of married women with young children worked during the year and only 10% 
worked full-time, year round.  By 1990, 68% of married women with young children worked outside the 
home and 28% worked full-time, year round.  By 1990, most married mothers of young children had 
some involvement in market work, although they typically were employed part-time.”).  But the fact is 
that mothers are not in the work force in the same manner as men: they usually work a modified 
schedule—part-time, flex-time, in the home, or they choose professions or jobs that, although full-time, 
allow them to be in the home more than a traditional “male” job.  Furthermore, it should be noted that 
women who work outside the home have fewer children.  See WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 13–39, 124 
(“Prior chapters have contested the accepted wisdom that it used to be ‘a man’s world’ but that ‘men and 
women are equal now.’  A more accurate description is that our system has shifted from one where 
(middle class) men were breadwinners and (middle-class) women were housewives to one where men 
are ideal workers and their wives (or ex-wives) are workers marginalized by caregiving.”); supra notes 
13–19 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra note 23. 
 111. See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 157 (2000) 
(While historically status and public recognition played the preeminent role in marriage, “[i]n the 
twentieth century the public framework of marriage would be preeminently economic, preserving the 
husband’s role as primary provider and the wife as his dependent—despite the growing presence of 
women in the labor force.”). 
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dependents suffer from divorce.112  Thus, the primary regulatory role for 
the state in marriage and divorce has shifted—and should continue to 
shift—from regulating entrance into marriage and preserving the 
continuity of the marital status toward protecting caregiving, 
dependency, and the welfare of children.113  Family law should create a 
supportive environment for rearing children, and upon the dissolution of 
a marriage, should protect the children and their caregivers who have the 
most to lose from the divorce. 
2. The Persistent Belief in the Relevance of Fault 
Even in a divorce that reflects contemporary norms, however, a 
persistent belief that marital wrongs deserve to be punished remains.  As 
Harry Krause asked: 
are not the risks of marriage increased and is marriage not diminished as a 
legal status, and as an economic good, if “good” or “bad” behavior does 
not matter?  Is it not intuitive—at least to the general public—that “fault” 
and “merit” are relevant to achieving “fairness”?  Fault and merit are 
relevant in all other areas of the law, so why are they not relevant to the 
fair distribution of the financial burdens (and benefits) of divorce?114 
Individuals may suffer significant harms in the emotionally charged 
breakdown of marital relations, which makes it difficult to accept the 
irrelevance of such harms in divorce.115  Arguably, fault, the part of 
divorce that allowed the parties to air grievances about the behavior that 
caused the breakdown of the marriage, provided an appropriate outlet.  It 
has been posited that the narrative and experience of wrongs suffered is 
so central to those undergoing divorce that ignoring them fails to capture 
the very nature of the divorce process.116  Simply put, fault matters to 
people, so why should it not matter in the law? 
The question remains as to whether the judicial process should reflect 
the reality of the emotional nature of divorce.117  Reflecting this reality 
in the law needs to be justified, not assumed.  Given the hostility and 
moral blame as between many divorcing couples, one should inquire 
 112. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 36–65; see also Krause, supra note 4, at 1361–62. 
 114. Krause, supra note 4, at 1363. 
 115. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2525, 2531; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 108 
(“Apparently, feelings of anger and blame are still a very real dimension of the breakup of modern 
marriage.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 504–06; Wardle, supra note 2, at 101. 
 117. Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Rights and Realities, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 39 (2008) 
(commenting on the debatable proposition of basing family law on the reality of family life where 
family life is affected by the law and can be amorphous). 
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into how the law is affecting the divorce process and whether it is 
creating a process that works.  Society supports the rights of people in 
failed marriages to exit those marriages without being forced to remain 
married.  Yet, marriage is still an emotional, love-based commitment 
entered into in the hope, if not the expectation that it will last for 
eternity.118  In that way, marital commitments are unique.119  Allowing 
relatively quick, unilateral, and guiltless separation without any 
consequences for wrongdoing can actually increase frustration, hostility, 
and tension during the divorce process and thereafter.120  Accordingly, it 
has been argued that perhaps fault divorce would create a more lasting 
and stable resolution of spousal disputes allowing the parties to move on 
and feel vindicated.121 
Despite its logic, this argument should be rejected.  Giving an 
expressive outlet to the anger involved in the breakdown of marriages 
within the judicial process of divorce is inappropriate for dealing with 
the typical reciprocal misunderstandings, blame, alienation, anger, and 
guilt that occur between spouses during most marriages that result in 
divorce.122  Except in instances of extreme and abusive behavior,123 
where the tort system should provide monetary recourse,124 such mutual 
blame and general breakdown cannot be fairly reflected through fault-
driven or fault-regarding divorce where a guilty and innocent party must 
be identified resulting in one party being punished and the other 
vindicated.125  Moreover, the mutual culpability, blame, and resentment 
that often results in divorce is inappropriate for objective identification 
as the “cause of divorce,” which can be elusive.126  Such mutual fault 
and recrimination was not part of the original concept of fault divorce, 
when divorce was intended to be awarded much less frequently than it 
 118. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 122. 
 119. Lynne Marie Kohn & Karen M. Groen, Cohabitation and the Future of Marriage, 17 
REGENT U. L. REV. 261, 272 (2005) (citing LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR 
MARRIAGE 36–46 (2000)). 
 120. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 99–103, 199–220, 129–30 (“Modern no-fault divorce laws fail 
to balance marriage stability goals with divorce facilitation policy, portray a defective model of marriage 
and inadequately provide for the public consequences of private choices.”). 
 121. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1362–64; Wilson, supra note 60, at 506–07; Woodhouse, supra 
note 9, at 2546–47. 
 122. Huntington, supra note 4, at 1303 (commending the end of fault divorce because fault 
divorce failed to contend with the complex realities of human emotion which involve love and hate but 
also guilt and reparation). 
 123. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 124. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 125. See Huntington, supra note 4, at 1296 (arguing that the divorce process should be focus on 
“repair” and in that process should contend with mutual blame, guilt, anger, and love). 
 126. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 50–51, 66–67 (discussing how most minor marital 
wrongs can not be easily pegged as the “cause” of divorce); Ellman, supra note 63, at 788–89. 
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currently is and mutuality or recrimination was a defense to divorce.127 
While family law cannot be the same as family counseling, it should 
lean on processes like mediation and collaborative family law in order to 
facilitate working relationships among family members beyond 
divorce.128  Families are still families after divorce when children are 
involved.  Because children are central to why we still need regulatory, 
protective family law, as opposed to private contracts and psychological 
counselors,129 the divorce process should not focus on assigning blame 
in a one-time fashion, whether through fault-driven or fault-regarding 
divorce, but should be part of a process of healing that can recreate a 
family support system for children in two households. 
C. Evaluating the Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Dependent Children 
and Their Caregivers 
Previous parts of this Article have defended the proposition that the 
focus of divorce law should be protecting and supporting dependents, 
and that despite the acrimony inherent in marital breakdown, fault in 
divorce cannot properly reflect such feelings.  This Part considers in 
greater depth how taking fault out of divorce will affect dependents and 
their caregivers.  First, it provides a brief introduction and historical 
perspective on the purpose and nature of no-fault divorce.  Second, it 
analyzes arguments that eliminating the role of fault from divorce hurts 
women and children by eliminating needed leverage in bargaining for 
financial incidents of divorce.  In countering that argument, this Part 
argues that since both men and women are equally likely to want to exit 
marriage, but that the financial punishments usually linked to fault 
divorce have a greater impact on women, fault divorce has a 
disproportionate, harmful effect on caregivers and dependents. 
Finally, this Part considers arguments against the abandonment of 
fault-driven divorce or divorce by consent because no-fault divorce has 
caused an increase in divorce rates and has punctured the stability of 
marriage.  Those arguments continue by arguing that because divorce 
hurts children, no-fault unilateral divorce goes against the interests of 
 127. A common defense to proving fault grounds for divorce was recrimination—if the accusing 
party was also guilty of some wrongdoing, the divorce would not be allowed.  See, e.g., J. Herbie 
Difonzo, Alternatives to Marital Fault: Legislative and Judicial Experiments in Cultural Change, 34 
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 53 (1997); see generally, Spaht, supra note 75. 
 128. See Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a 
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363 (2009); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 322–23 (2004); Nancy Ver Steegh, Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting 
Values and Expectations Transform the Divorce Process, 42 FAM. L.Q. 659 (2008). 
 129. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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in many 
ins
Accordingly, the “forward-looking”135 American Law Institute’s 
children.  This Part critiques these arguments on two levels.  First, while 
it is clear that children benefit from a stable two-parent home, evidence 
does not support the proposition that keeping parents in an unwanted 
marriages will always be in the best interests of the children of the 
marriage.  Second, the correlation between no-fault divorce and the 
divorce rate is too complex to be reliable, and marriage is still a thriving 
institution. 
1. The Purpose of No-Fault Divorce 
If marriage regulations are to focus on dependents and their 
caregivers as opposed to disputes between spouses or attempts to 
entrench spouses within marriages, it seems logical that divorce laws 
should aim to smooth potentially harsh effects on children and ensure 
that parents are able to work together after divorce.  As Herma Hill Kay 
noted, no-fault divorce was devised as a method of decreasing hostility 
between divorcing couples and ensuring that resolution of disputes 
received the proper support in family courts with specialized judges.130  
The need to prove grounds and to counter harsh defenses created 
financial and emotional turmoil.131  This acrimony could not have 
served children’s interest in the divorce process.132  Although the 
California Commission’s ideal of eliminating fault-driven as well as 
fault-regarding divorce did not become reality, the dissolution of 
marriage has been veering toward a more collaborative system for 
divorce.133  No-fault divorce does eliminate the necessity for a focus on 
blame in obtaining a divorce: even if the system has been less supportive 
than originally envisioned, blame is still part of the process 
tances. 
A divorce process focused on addressing the needs of the parties and 
their children, as well as settling financial and custodial issues post-
divorce in a manner that focuses on the interests of children and 
caregivers, would only seem to be frustrated by contending with blame 
and fault, whether in a fault-driven or fault-regarding system.134  
 
 130. See Kay, supra note 5, at 4–5; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 92. 
dle, supra note 2, at 92. 
their lives without getting bogged down in blame and the 
rre
 131. War
 132. Id. 
 133. See Huntington, supra note 4, at 1287. 
 134. See, e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. 1973) (stating that the purpose of no-
fault divorce is to help families get on with 
co sponding harm that results to children). 
 135. Unable to make a model law out of such disparate state systems, the ALI sets out to make 
proactive recommendations while capturing the best of what has already taken hold in state systems.  
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Principles of Family Dissolution (ALI Principles) make the case that 
divorce should focus on post-divorce living standards and ensuring 
adequate financial resources and should not relate to blame at all.136  
This is particularly so in a divorce process that reflects modern 
sentiment that it is not worthwhile to keep spouses married, when even 
one of the spouses desires to leave the marriage.  Both fault-driven and 
fault-regarding divorce does not seem to serve the goals of a divorce 
process intended to deal with dependents and dependency.137 
2. The Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Women’s Bargaining Power 
Feminists have been critical of no-fault divorce for its effects on 
dependents and their caregivers.138  In particular, Lenore Weitzman, in 
her influential sociological study, argued that no-fault divorce had 
harmed women by tipping the bargaining power to men.139  While the 
degree of disparity she represented is contested, it is undisputed that 
women are worse off after divorce than men.140  Because of women’s 
greater level of caregiving activities during marriage141 and because of 
men’s greater market work participation resulting in higher earning 
power, women suffer financially more than men at the time of divorce 
and need more financial adjustments through property distribution and 
alimony.142  Such caregiving activities may cause financial instability 
post-divorce whether undertaken by men or women.143  When 
caregivers suffer financially, the well-being of the children for whom 
See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02; see also James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 
n: 
T. L. REV. 1111 (1999). 
t. 
xt. 
IND. L.J. 875, 923 (2000). 
 136. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 44–53. 
 137. This does not mean that considerations of abusive behavior—particularly when aimed at 
children—should not be relevant in determining who should have primary physical custody.  This is 
crucial for the well-being of children and should be included in a best interests analysis.  See supra notes 
58–59, 67–70 and accompanying text.  Primary physical custody, however, should be presumed to go to 
the primary caretaker absent such clear showings of abuse.  See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 47.  
Yet, consideration of abusive behavior during a custody determination is different than awarding 
custody to the “innocent” party as opposed to the guilty party against whom a divorce is issued in the 
manner of traditional fault divorce law.  See, e.g., Kay, supra note 33; Danaya C. Wright, “Well 
Behaved Women Don’t Make History”: Rethinking English Family, Law, and History, 19 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 211, 313 (2004); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Childre
The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PIT
 138. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying tex
 139. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying te
 143. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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 divorce to extract 
fro
en more determinate have a clear impact on the 
se
 
they care suffers as well.144  Based on her study, Weitzman claims that 
no-fault divorce contributed to the relative poverty of divorced women 
because not needing to prove grounds for divorce or obtain a consensual 
divorce gave women less control in determining the financial incidents 
of divorce.145  Weitzman argues that grounds for divorce helped women 
by giving them extra bargaining power at the time of
m their spouses much needed financial support.146 
In other words, the fear is that no-fault divorce allows a man to take 
advantage of his wife’s caretaking services during marriage and then 
walk away from a virtuous wife over her objections leaving his wife to 
suffer for her choices during marriage.147  Although equitable property 
division rules that consider homemaking services often lead to equal 
division of property at divorce, this does not contend with the difference 
in future earning capacity.148  Alimony is unpredictable and rarely 
awarded.149  This is particularly problematic when there is little property 
to divide, which is usually the case.150  Moreover, given that the vast 
majority of divorces are settled by agreement, the bargaining power 
realities are often much more prescient than judge-made law151—
although such laws wh
ttlement process.152 
It should be noted that empirical data confirming such claims is 
inconclusive.153  There is some anecdotal evidence from states like New 
York that fault-driven or consensual divorce can help women bargaining 
for better financial settlements.154  Others, including the American Law 
Institute, have argued that it is not no-fault or unilateral divorce that is 
 144. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 145. WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 25–27, 323–29. 
 146. Id. at 25–27, 323–29.  See also Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and 
Opportunism, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 869 (1994); ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT 
WRONG 79–80 (1992). 
 147. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 105 (1987) 
(referring to no-fault divorce as “no-responsibility” divorce). 
 148. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 60–65 (discussing need for caretaker alimony to deal 
with this discrepancy). 
 149. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 329 (3d 
ed. 2006); Katherine C. Daniels et al., Alternative Formulas for Distributing Parental Incomes at 
Divorce, 27 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 4, 6 (2006) (collecting studies and noting that spousal support is 
only awarded in ten to fifteen percent of cases). 
 150. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 146, at 877–78; WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 1186–88. 
 151. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining the Shadow of the Law: The Case of 
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979). 
 152. Id. at 954–57. 
 153. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 9, at 195; Katerhine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the 
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 835 (1998). 
 154. Garrison, supra note 8, at 90–100. 
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se caregivers would arguably be the most effective measure to 
tak
ma
the source of the problem, but the lack of legislation intended to 
preserve the financial stability of women after divorce.155  More direct 
legislation providing for caregiver support and the primary caregiver 
presumption would be more directly effective in curing imbalances in 
determining divorce settlements.156  If the focus of divorce legislation is 
on dependents and their caregivers, ensuring sufficient financial support 
to tho
e. 
Moreover, the feminist argument that rejects no-fault divorce because 
it deprives women of bargaining power with regard to the financial 
incidents of divorce fails to recognize the modern reality that women, 
and by extension primary caregivers, are increasingly the parties who 
are at fault or who initiate the divorce.157  No longer tied to marital 
status for social legitimacy, unhappy women are leaving marriages 
nearly as often as men.  Weitzman acknowledges that caregivers only 
receive alimony under fault divorce when they are innocent, but assumes 
that they usually are.158  Yet, women are at fault or instigate divorce 
proceedings in modern times at an increasing rate.  Recent studies 
suggest that women are equally likely to commit adultery as men are.159  
Accordingly, given their increasing lack of innocence and desire to leave 
rriages, women suffer from the same need to bargain as men. 
Hence, the bargaining power argument, while it may help women in 
individual instances, increasingly weakens women’s strategic advantage 
in bargaining for needed financial support.160  As discussed above, fault-
driven divorce is also fault-regarding; traditionally, grounds determine 
not only the granting of a divorce but whichever party was able to prove 
 
 155. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers 
Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L., POL’Y & FAM. 216, 229–30 (1997); 
see also Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable 
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 636 (1991) (suggesting that her 
research on the effects of divorce in New York demonstrates not a lack of women’s bargaining power at 
l support). 
ts Are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. 
S, June 28, 
 exit marriages are men, which is not always the case 
divorce, but a lack of rules that provide sufficient spousa
 156. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 46–47. 
 157. See Sanford L. Braver, Marnie Whitley, & Christine Ng, Who Divorced Whom? 
Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993); Margaret F. Brinig & 
Douglas W. Allen, “These Boo
L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000). 
 158. See WEITZMAN, supra note 8, at 13; see also Singer, supra note 6, at 1110. 
 159. Benedict Carey & Tara Parker-Pope, Marriage Stands Up for Itself, N.Y. TIME
2009, at ST1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/fashion/28marriage.html. 
 160. See Marygold S. Melli, Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women 
and Children, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 759, 770–71 (1986) (Weitzman’s bargaining power 
argument assumes that most people who want to
and thus fault divorce does not hurt all women.). 
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determinations.165  After divorce, primary earners retain their jobs 
grounds also enjoyed a bundle of financial and custodial rewards.161  
The extent of a spouse’s guilt is still a factor in many jurisdictions when 
fault is relevant in setting the alimony, determining property 
distribution, or determining custody.162  Primary caregivers, who are 
usually women, have much more to lose in such bargains, and thus, the 
lack of power hurts them more than it does men.  Primary caregivers 
have become attached to those children and are wholly or partially 
financially dependent on their husbands.163  Therefore, the primary 
caregiver stands to lose disproportionately from the condemnation of 
“improper” behavior through reduced financial support because she is 
more in need of such support.164  Moreover, primary caregivers are more 
attached to the children for whom they care and more vulnerable to the 
severing of ties with the marital children if fault affects custody 
 
 161. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 585 (1968) (“The best illustration 
of this is also the commonest case, where the divorce is granted for the wife’s adultery.  Some courts 
have been unduly rigid in refusing to give the wife custody where it appeared quite clearly that the child 
would be better of in her care.”); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
M 
opf 
n who strayed outside the bonds 
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 33–35 (1988); Singer, supra note 7, at 1461 (1992); Lynn A. 
Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 25–52 (1990). 
 162. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Kay, supra note 5, at 6 (citing ROBERT LEVY, UNIFOR
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS V, B-1 to B-18 (1969)); Grossk
v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984); Williams v. Williams, 415 S.E.2d 252 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). 
 163. See Spaht, supra note 75, at 295–96; see also supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 164. The traditional and outdated grounds system of divorce essentially reflects a system in which 
property belongs to men and it is for women to lose.  Women are to be protected and coveted when 
good, but punished when bad.  Under early English common law principles, adopted in the U.S., in all 
but eight states that have adopted community property rules, husband and wife were considered one 
legal entity, but the husband was the “one” who enjoyed control and ownership rights over the marital 
assets.  Later, under constructive trust principles, and under the Married Women’s Property Acts, the 
economic inequality was partially alleviated.  But upon divorce, there was still a rebuttable presumption 
in most states that the wage earner—traditionally the husband—owned most of the property acquired 
during the marriage.  Not until 1970 did the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States 
Laws draft the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which, borrowing from community property 
precedent, instituted a classification for property division on divorce based upon marital separate 
property.  Thus, the backdrop for fault rules in marriage is clear: the background was that men owned 
the property and that at most the woman was entitled to some support upon divorce, and that support 
could be lost as a result of her bad behavior.  See Sally F. Golfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for 
Permanent Alimony, in ALIMONY: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PURSUIT AND DEFENSE (1988), reprinted in 27 
J. FAM. L. 351 (1989).  Harriet Martineau, an English sociologist who visited the United States in the 
1840’s describes the position of women and the problem of domesticity as such: “Indulgence is given 
her as a substitute for justice.”  3 HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN AMERICA 106, 296 (1837).  Despite 
their elevation (in marriage), society respected and protected women only insofar as they complied with 
an exacting ideal of virtuous and submissive womanhood.  The glorification of domestic femininity was 
tightly bound to a correspondingly harsh condemnation of those wome
of patronage and dependence.  See id.  See also infra notes 284–292 and accompanying text describing 
why torts provides a more just financial recourse for abusive behavior. 
 165. See, e.g., Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814; Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982); 
Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So.2d 5 (La. 1986); Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); 
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making them less dependent on alimony or property distributed.  They 
are more accustomed to seeing their children for limited periods of time 
as market work keeps them away from home.  This might cause more 
dependent women to remain in marriages that they would otherwise 
want to exit, but this is a questionable objective that is out of sync with 
contemporary social mores.166  Indeed, fault divorce disproportionately 
punishes the very caregivers and children whose welfare divorce 
regulation should be focused on protecting. 
3. The Effect of No-Fault Divorce on Children 
Scholars have voiced serious concern over the ease of unilateral no-
fault divorce in light of the potential harms of divorce on children.167  
Several commentators have argued that allowing “easy divorce” in the 
no-fault system does not adequately incentivize parents to work out their 
problems and remain in the marriage.168  If no-fault divorce leads to 
more divorce and divorce hurts children, then perhaps no-fault divorce 
does not further the goals adopted herein of protecting and supporting 
dependents and their caregivers.169  Scholars and legislators have 
therefore proposed a two-tier divorce system, making it harder for 
couples with children to divorce.170  William Galston has even proposed 
eliminating unilateral no-fault divorce for marriages with minor 
children.171 
Yet, studies on the effect of divorce on children are mixed making it 
Francis v. Francis, 823 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Endy v. Endy, 603 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
ald Schiller, Fault Undercuts Equity, 
lman, supra note 63, at 807–08. 
beth S. Scott, Rational 
obert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 
: A Critique of Recent Proposals to 
American Style, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1996, at 12, 22–23.  
1992); see also Norma Lichtenstein, Marital Misconduct and the Allocation of Financial Resources at 
Divorce: A Farewell to Fault, 54 UMKC L. REV. 1, 8 (1985); Don
10 FAM. ADVOCATE 10 (1987); El
 166. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 167. See generally Difonzo, supra note 135; JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, 
SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 10–20, 129–204 (1989); 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Paul C. Bitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of 
Parental Separation on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1983); Eliza
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 29 (1990). 
 168. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 147, at 106–08 (1987); GLENN T. STANTON, WHY 
MARRIAGE MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POST-MODERN SOCIETY (1997); Spaht, 
supra note 98, at 1552–59; R
1435, 1438–41 (1998). 
 169. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 170. Michigan State Representative Jessie F. Dalman introduced such a bill in 1996.  See Kay, 
supra note 33; see also Laura Bradford, Note, The Counterrevolution
Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 607 (1997). 
 171. William Galston, Braking Divorce for the Sake of Children, AM. ENTERPRISE, May–June 
1996, at 36; William A. Galston, Divorce 
See also Difonzo, supra note 135, at 928. 
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ing stable families, however 
be
support actually received and financially stability experienced.   In 
difficult to articulate sweeping generalizations.172  While it is clear that 
studies demonstrate that children of intact marriages benefit from their 
stable family structure,173 and that children suffer financially and 
emotionally from divorce as compared to that previous intact family 
structure,174 it is unclear whether children of divorce or single-parent 
households would be better off with their parents married or in two-
parent homes.  Modern, intact families are most usually coupled by 
parents who desire to be together, not those in broken marriages staying 
together by sheer dictate.  It is unclear what family life would be like for 
children with parents who would prefer not to be married, but rather 
divorced.175  Practically, preventing divorce by making it fault-driven or 
simply prohibited cannot recreate lov
neficial to children such families are. 
On the other hand, studies have more directly concluded that two 
issues have serious effects on children’s well-being: (1) the level of 
conflict to which children are exposed; and (2) the amount of child 
176
 
 172. See ROBERT EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 1 (1999); 
Yongmin Sun, Family Environment and Adolescents’ Well-Being Before and After Parents’ Marital 
Disruption: A Longitudinal Analysis, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 697 (2001); Donna Ruane Morrison & 
Mary Jo Coiro, Parental Conflict and Marital Disruption: Do Children Benefit When High-Conflict 
Marriages are Dissolved?, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 626, 636 (1999) (finding, based on a study of 727 
children between the ages of four and nine in 1988 who lived in intact families to determine the relation 
between parents’ marital conflict and childrens’ level of behavior problems in 1994, that “frequent 
E IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY 
0 ( Impact of Divorce on Children: An Assessment of 
 show that parents 
marital conflict has a deleterious effect on children, possibly even exceeding the adverse effects of 
physical separation or divorce”). 
 173. See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan et al., The Child Abuse Crises: The Disintegration of Marriage, 
Family, and the American Community, BACKGROUNDER (1997); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY 
SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE-PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); GLENN T. 
STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEV
1 1997); David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, The 
Recent Evidence, 50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 619, 622 (1988). 
 174. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 175. But see AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 93, at 238 (concluding that studies
staying in unhappy marriages would benefit children).  Yet, since unhappy people generally do not stay 
together, it is impossible to actually study what such families would be like. 
 176. See Paul. R. Amato & Bruce Keith, Parental Divorce and the Well-Being of Children: A 
Meta-Analysis, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 43 (1991) (“Meta-analysis supports the notion that the impact 
of father absence appears to be mediated by family conflict; father absence in itself may not affect 
children’s well-being.  The family conflict perspective was strongly confirmed by the data.  This 
perspective holds that children in intact families with high levels of conflict should have the same well-
being problems as children of divorce, and the data supported this hypothesis.”); DANIEL G. SAUNDERS, 
NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
DECISIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: LEGAL TRENDS, RISK FACTORS, AND SAFETY CONCERNS 
(Revised 2007) (“Enthusiasm for joint custody in the early 1980s was fueled by studies of couples who 
were highly motivated to ‘make it work.’  This enthusiasm has waned in recent years, in part because of 
social science findings. . . . [For example,] Johnston concluded from her [most recent] review of 
research that ‘highly conflictual parents’ (not necessarily violent) had a poor prognosis for becoming 
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theory, such benefits might be gained either inside or outside of 
marriage.  In particular, studies have shown that in the context of high 
conflict marriages, children of divorce have been better off than children 
of parents who have remained in marriage.177  While the tension and 
instability occasioned by divorce undoubtedly harm children,178 so does 
living inside an unloving, potentially abusive relationship mired by 
conflict.  Clearly, quantifying which is worse in each situation is 
difficult.  Similarly, it is not possible to ascertain with any clarity which 
marriages are better left intact for the sake of children and which are 
better dissolved.  Marriages are fluid as are their effects on children.  It 
is clear that financial stability, low conflict, and supportive 
environments are extremely beneficial to children.  Thus, in order to 
maximize children’s interests, the goal of divorce law should be 
providing a low-conflict process for divorce and ensuring sufficient 
financial support post-marriage through direct legislation. 
The argument that no-fault unilateral divorce hurts children assumes 
that no-fault divorce leads to more divorce and thereby strikes at the 
stability of the marriage relationship.  However, it is not clear that no-
fault divorce actually increases divorce rates.  It is not contested that 
divorce rates almost doubled between 1969 and 1985, during which time 
every state liberalized their divorce laws, making unilateral no-fault the 
divorce the reality for most.179  Logically, it should not be surprising 
that easing access to divorce would increase the number of divorces—
no-fault unilateral divorce is less costly and does not have preventative 
eligibility requirements.  Brining and Buckley argue that under an 
expanded notion of fault, allowing for consideration of fault regarding 
states, an empirical analysis does demonstrate increased divorce in pure 
no-fault states relative to fault-regarding states.180 
On the other hand, many scholars have contested this correlation.  In a 
convincing law and economic analysis, Elizabeth Peters argued that, 
 
cooperative parents,” and “[t]here is increasing evidence, however, that children of divorce have more 
problems because of the conflict between the parents before the divorce and not because of the divorce 
itself . . . .” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)); E. Mavis Hetherington, Should We Stay 
Together for the Sake of the Children, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING AND 
REMARRIAGE: A RISK AND RESILIENCY PERSPECTIVE 93–116 (1999). 
 177. See Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being 
During Early Adulthood, 73 SOC. FORCES 895 (1995); Susan Jekielek, Parental Conflict, Marital 
Disruption and Children’s Emotional Well-Being, 76 SOC. FORCES 905 (1998). 
 178. See supra notes 173–174 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57, at 325–26; ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, 
DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 20–25 (1992). 
 180. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 57, at 326–27; see also Wardle, supra note 2, at 116–19 
(“[I]t is apparent that the significant rise in the divorce rate in the United States did not begin until the 
no-fault divorce reform movement was well-underway.”). 
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f reality than the alternative of direct 
ca
college-educated men married in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is 
 
because of Coasian bargaining, divorce levels should not be affected by 
the legal regime.181  She argues that the economics of divorce should 
change and provides data supporting her argument.182  To that end, 
Marsha Garrison pointed out that divorce rates in mutual consent states, 
where fault grounds are more commonly used, are not lower than in no-
fault states.183  Other scholars simply point to the continuing increase in 
divorce rates over the second half of the twentieth century, beginning 
from before the time of the liberalization of divorce laws, and point out 
that causation cannot be inferred from correlation.184  Finally, many 
have opined that both no-fault laws and the increasing divorce rate were 
caused by the same sociological factors that developed around mid-
century.  The most important of these factors is women’s increasing 
presence in the work force.185  In particular, as discussed above, 
changing social mores regarding marriage have certainly affected 
modern views of divorce and have made divorce more acceptable and 
common.186  Divorce laws likely do not cause a change in society, but 
rather the laws and change in society reflect reciprocal influence more 
generally.187  This complex relationship between social norms and the 
law is much more reflective o
usation in either direction.188 
Furthermore, more recently, the rates of divorce have stabilized and 
even declined.189  A recent New York Times article reported a 
conglomeration of studies indicating that ten year divorce rates among 
 181. See Elizabeth H. Peters, Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private 
Contracting, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 437 (1986). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Garrison, supra note 87, at 316–17. 
 184. See, e.g., Maire Ni Bhrolchain, “Divorce Effects” and Causality in the Social Sciences, 17 
EUROPEAN SOC. REV. 33, 44–53 (2001); V.R. MCKIN & S.P. TURNER, CAUSALITY IN CRISIS?: 
STATISTICAL METHODS AND THE SEARCH FOR CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1997); 
see also Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon L. Lohr, Dissolving the Relationship Between Divorce Laws and 
Divorce Rates, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 341 (1998). 
 185. See CHERLIN, supra note 179, at 51; JACOB, supra note 161, at 17–18 (1988). 
 186. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 187. Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991 
(1989) (“Law is a . . . thing that is shaped by culture, and in turn shapes the culture.”).  Due to the 
problem of complicity, fault-driven divorce may not even prevent divorces in light of social mores 
driving up divorce rates.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 188. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of 
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 7–13 (2000); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 148–
49 (1991) (“It is rarely if ever possible to isolate the effects of legal reform from social forces that 
produced it.”). 
 189. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 59, 
tbl.66 (2002). 
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declining:190 
Among men who married in the 1970s, for example, about 23 percent had 
divorced by the 10th year of marriage.  Among similar men married in the 
1980s, about 20 percent had divorced by the 10th year.  Men married in 
the 1990s are doing even better—with a 10-year divorce rate of 16 
percent.191 
Indeed, marital relations appear stronger and more resilient.192 
Scholars have also expressed concern that the meaning and 
importance of marriage may suffer from unilateral no-fault divorce in 
particular when alternative means of protecting rights, such as “Marvin” 
cohabitation contracts193 and domestic partnership options have become 
more accessible.194  Because co-habitants can do much to secure 
marriage-like rights via contracts and married couples can contract away 
from the normal obligations of marriage, the lines are blurring.195  Some 
argue that unilateral no-fault divorce laws coupled with expanded rights 
for cohabitants weakens the institution of marriage by undercutting the 
social norm that marriage is a life-long commitment different from 
simply living together.196  Yet, given the modern popular belief that 
marriage and cohabitation are both acceptable and different options, it is 
not clear that creating an alternative to marriage is a problem.197  
Empirically, cohabitation looks different in practice than marriage as it 
is usually entered into by younger people with less financial stability and 
for shorter amounts of time.198  Finally, marriage remains a popular and 
well-regarded institution that people continue to fight to enter.199 
In sum, fault in divorce is still at issue in U.S. law because of the 
 190. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The term “Marvin” cohabitation contracts refers to contracts between unmarried cohabitants 
legitimized by the California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
 194. Krause, supra note 103, at 293–94; Garrison, supra note 87, at 325–30. 
 195. Krause, supra note 103, at 293–94. 
 196. See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY 
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER HEALTHIER AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000); Scott, supra note 
54. 
 197. Garrison, supra note 87, at 325–31 (arguing that cohabitation and marriage have different 
benefits and are experienced differently and therefore cohabitants should be treated differently than 
married persons). 
 198. Id. at 323–24.  See also Pamela Smock & Wendy Manning, Living Together Unmarried in 
the United States: Demographic Perspectives and Implications for Family Policy, 26 LAW & POL’Y 87, 
87–92, 96–98 (2004). 
 199. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 87, at 325; LETTY COTTIN POGREBIN, FAMILY POLITICS: 
LOVE AND POWER ON AN INTIMATE FRONTIER 21–22, 24–26 (1983); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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prevalence of fault-regarding divorce as well as in states still requires 
consensual divorce.  Unilateral no-fault divorce is increasingly the norm 
and properly reflects contemporary social mores.  Divorce regulations 
should focus on caregivers and children who have the most at stake and 
suffer the most from unregulated unilateral no-fault divorce.  No-fault 
divorce provides the best forum for supporting post-divorce families, 
easing tension and creating stability.  Indeed, allowing fault into the 
divorce process disproportionately harms caregivers and the children 
affected by the well-being of such caregivers and cannot appropriately 
help children by saving failed marriages. 
III. THE CASE FOR SPOUSAL TORTS 
Having set out why a determination of fault in divorce does not 
coincide with the interests of children, the interest of their caregivers, or 
societal norms, and therefore is not appropriate for divorce law, the 
question is whether the law should contend with wrongdoing between 
spouses in any context?  Furthermore, what is the nature of the 
wrongdoing that should be addressed by the law—should it differ from 
the nature of fault in divorce?  This Part argues for considering 
wrongdoing between spouses exclusively within the context of torts and 
under a heightened threshold for defining culpability. 
The first subpart provides an outline of the law of spousal torts.  
While spousal torts have been introduced in a number of jurisdictions, 
such cases are rarely brought in the context of physical or emotional 
abuse and are even more rarely successful.  It then discusses why that is 
and what can be done about it.  Finally, the first subpart provides a legal 
framework for how spousal torts should work, replete with examples for 
clarity. 
The second subpart argues the normative case for spousal torts.  The 
subpart argues for the benefits of spousal torts on three levels.  First, 
spousal torts are appropriate to ensure recourse against all physical and 
extreme dignitary harms, and especially for those harms to which 
caregivers are disproportionately vulnerable—domestic abuse.  Second, 
it argues that the relative rarity and punitive aspect of torts more fairly 
punishes those wrongdoers who have committed physical and serious 
dignity abuse than litigations over fault in divorce.  Finally, the second 
subpart concludes that tort law is an appropriate and powerful tool that 
should be wielded in all instances of harm, in particular harms that are 
more often faced by women. 
The third subpart addresses critiques of spousal torts.  Namely, it 
considers arguments that identifying outrageous and extraordinary 
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behavior is too difficult in the context of the subjective intimacy of 
marriage, that allowing spousal torts will only increase acrimony 
between divorcing spouses, that spousal torts ignore the complexity of 
marital relations, and that spousal torts are too expensive and 
impractical. 
A. Contemporary Jurisprudence of Spousal Torts 
1. The Lack of Recourse to Spousal Torts 
Despite the fact that inter-spousal immunities have been almost 
entirely abolished, abuse between spouses, both physical and emotional, 
is rarely addressed in the tort context.200  In the marital home, if the 
abuse is physical, the law protects the vulnerable through criminal and 
tortious domestic violence protection, although tort claims are rarely 
used.201  But emotional abuse in the home is the true orphan.  A few 
state statutes prohibiting domestic violence and enabling victims to 
receive protection orders include psychological abuse, but they do not 
provide for monetary redress.202  Some states allow spouses to bring 
torts for intentionally inflicting emotional abuse, but the tort is still 
controversial and not widely accepted.203 
 200. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 139, 153–54 (2005) (arguing that tort law and scholarship ignore the relevance of domestic 
violence to tort doctrine because (1) torts has been conceptualized as pertaining primarily to accidental 
injury and (2) because there are few domestic violence torts to even analyze). 
 201. See id. at 155–56; Sarah H. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal 
Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 950 (2004) 
(discussing various reasons the domestic violence torts are underused and arguing for a new tort of 
domestic violence to cure judicial failure to provide proper recourse). 
 202. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2010) (making a civil protection order available for ‘Extreme 
psychological abuse’ which is defined as “an intentional or knowing course of conduct directed at an 
individual that seriously alarms or disturbs consistently or continually bothers the individual, and that 
serves no legitimate purpose; provided that such course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to 
suffer extreme emotional distress”); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 400.1501(d) (West 2010) (“[c]ausing 
or attempting to cause physical or mental harm to a family or household member”). 
 203. See, e.g., Hendriksen v. Carrero, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993); Davis v. Bostik, 580 P.2d 544 
(Or. 1978); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Col. Ct. App. 1988); McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).  The tort of IIED 
between spouses has been explicitly rejected in a number of states.  See Weiker v. Weiker, 237 N.E.2d 
876 (N.Y. 1968) (rejecting a IIED between spouses); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 
1989); Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Wis. 1991) (barring an IIED action between spouses 
because allowing it would undermine opposition to heart balm claims); Linda L. Berger, Lies Between 
Mommy and Daddy: The Case for Recognizing Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on the 
Domestic Deceit that Interferes with Parent-Child Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 463 (2000); 
see also Gwen Seaquist & Eileen Kelly, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Divorce: New 
York’s Reluctance to Enter the Fray, 10 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 29 (2002).  Many other states have yet 
to address the issue. 
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For instance, in Twyman v. Twyman the Texas Supreme Court 
recognized the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(IIED) between spouses for conduct that occurred during their 
marriage.204  To make an IIED claim, one must prove intentional 
conduct, that is extreme and outrageous, and that causes severe 
distress.205  The specific conduct alleged in Twyman was coercive 
deviant sexual interactions, aggravated by a history of violent rape.206  
In Twyman, Texas became the forty-seventh state to recognize a tortious 
claim of IIED.207  However, in permitting such claims between spouses, 
especially in the context of a divorce, the Texas Supreme Court was at 
the forefront of allowing money damages for emotional injuries between 
spouses.  Only a limited number of states, in limited circumstances, 
allow such claims for purely emotional abuse that occurred during 
marriage.208  Yet, given the success courts have had in crafting a 
sustainable and contained cause of action for such torts in these states,209 
the possibilities for providing this outlet for emotionally abused spouses 
more broadly are evident.  Indeed, despite the widespread acceptance of 
IIED to provide recourse for dignitary harms among strangers, 
emotional wrongs in the home are largely not addressed by the law 
unless state law recognizes such abuses in the context of fault 
 
 204. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).  The possibility of allowing negligent infliction of emotional 
distress between spouses was also discussed in Twyman by the dissent.  See id. 640–45 (Spector, J., 
dissenting).  Since IIED is a more developed and accepted tort as between strangers, and would cover 
the intentional dignitary harms between spouses that are arguably the most disturbing and culpable, it is 
the focus of this Article.  See TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOVERY IN THE 90’S 
109–110 (1990); W. PAGE KEATON et. al., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984); 
. L.J. 763, 773 (1996). 
f 
sault, then it should be considered IIED as between spouses. 
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress in 
2d 696, 699 (Utah 1954), overruled in part by 
Bradley Peacock, Recent Decision, 65 MISS
 205. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621. 
 206. Id.  This Article does not intend to opine as to whether the facts in Twyman constitute IIED.  
See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Queer Theory’s critique of the facts of Twyman).  But, to the extent 
that the facts in Twyman would constitute IIED as between strangers, assuming the man was aware o
the woman’s previous history of sexual as
 207. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621. 
 208. See Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (cause of action for IIED brought by husband regarding wife’s 
failure to notify husband that child born during marriage was not his should be allowed and considered 
separately from divorce); Bailey v. Searles-Bailey, 746 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see also 
supra note 203 and accompanying text; George C. Blum, Inten
the Marital Context, 110 A.L.R.5th 371 (2003, with updates). 
 209. Only a limited number of claims have been brought in total in the U.S.  See, e.g., Hakkila v. 
Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N,M. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting argument that all such claims should be rejected 
because they will cause an onslaught of meritless claims because only a limited number of claims had 
been brought); Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976) (When immunity is abolished, the 
“‘uninvited kiss’” does not become a significant problem, since the court is competent to identify 
frivolous claims.); see also Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962); Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 
592 (Utah 1980) (citing Taylor v. Patten, 275 P.
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah 1963)). 
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divorce,210 even though it is widely acknowledged that domestic abuse 
can be emotional in natu 211
2. The Reasons That Spousal Torts Are Limited 
The alternative outlet for airing grievances between spouses, fault 
considerations in divorce, has considerably stunted adjudication of 
spousal torts.212  Before the advent of no-fault divorce, the vast majority 
of states maintained immunities between spouses for torts.213  Fault 
divorce was the only avenue of recovery for an injured spouse.214  Now, 
there is potential overlap as the same wrongs could be tort grounds or 
fault divorce grounds depending on a state’s willingness to consider 
spousal torts, the breadth of such consideration, and the availability of 
grounds for a fault divorce.215  Such recoveries can be problematically 
duplicative because they provide financial recourse for the same 
wrongs.216  There are a myriad of procedural impediments to bringing 
both torts and fault divorce covering the same issues.217  Strict no-fault 
states are hesitant to allow fault between spouses to be considered in the 
context of a tort suit for fear a remedy that was intended to have been 
abolished is finding another outlet.218  Fault–regarding states are mixed 
as to the appropriate forum for considering fault and are legitimately 
concerned about double recovery.  Therefore, fault states often join the 
two cases, harming the separate nature of the divorce process.219  Courts 
instinctively flinch when asked to consider torts that feel like fault 
divorce, deferring to the specialized family law system.220  The 
 210. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 55–64. 
 211. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 891 (1992) (recognizing that 
domestic violence can be purely psychological and committed in the form of forced social and economic 
isolation, verbal harassment, threats of future violence, or destruction of personal property); see also Joy 
M. Bingham, Protecting Victims by Working Around the System and Within the System: Statutory 
rl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 MONT. L. REV. 
sday, Contest and Consent: A Legal 
2–503 (2000). 
pp. 1989). 
S.D. 1989) (considering spousal torts a 
vorce). 
n, 
Protection for Emotional Abuse in the Domestic Violence Context, 81 N.D. L. REV. 837 (2005). 
 212. See Ca
101, 101 (1999). 
 213. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538.  See also CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, 
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 816–45 (2001); Jill Elaine Ha
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 148
 214. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538. 
 215. Id.  See also Twyman v. Twyman, 835 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). 
 216. See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. Ct. A
 217. See Evans, supra note 4, at 481–89; see also infra notes 222–225. 
 218. See, e.g., Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (
violation of public policy supporting no-fault di
 219. See Whittington, 766 S.W.2d at 75. 
 220. Usually, by failing to find the adequate amount of intentionality, distress or outrageousness 
necessary for a claim of IIED.  See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2538–39; see also Hassing v. Wortma
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 the same wrongdoing. 
 
confusion and conflict surrounding whether marital wrongs belong in 
divorce or in torts litigation demonstrates the need to determine which is 
the more suitable forum.221  A clear and exclusive demarcation of a 
place within torts for contending with wrongdoing during marriage is 
needed to avoid potential ambiguity. 
The procedural legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
have complicated and even prevented bringing claims for spousal torts 
when fault is potentially relevant during a divorce.222  Certain 
jurisdictions,223 as well as a number of legal scholars,224 have argued 
that all claims arising out of the same subject matter or nucleus of 
facts—i.e., the marriage—should be litigated simultaneously as one 
case, or at least by one court.225  Failure to bring a tort claim during the 
divorce process would prevent bringing a later tort suit for actions that 
occurred during the marriage.  If the same behavior is relevant in 
divorce and in the tort process, joinder of the divorce and the tort makes 
sense not only to avoid duplicative legal proceedings but also to avoid 
double recovery for
Yet, bringing a tort suit along with a divorce suit can create confusion 
and elongation of the divorce process to the detriment of a spouse that 
has suffered some grave harm and thus likely needs a quick escape from 
the marriage.  Fault considerations in divorce can, and usually do, 
elongate proceedings by making spouses more defensive and less likely 
to agree to the divorce, particularly if they have to part with additionally 
money because of the accusations of fault.226  Requiring joinder 
333 N.W.2d 765, 771 (Neb. 1983); Wiener v. Wiener, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
 221. See Buel, supra note 201, at 949, 998; Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and 
Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 378 (1997) (general discussion of 
problems arising out of joinder and analysis of case law dealing with joinder in various states). 
 222. For instance, in Twyman v. Twyman, fault was relevant to the divorce process and thus the 
court allowed for joinder subject to the principles of res judicata.  See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 
619 (Tex. 1993).  The court noted however, that if the tortious conduct was not relevant to the divorce, 
joinder would not be appropriate.  See also Evans, supra note 4, at 481–89 (thorough review of potential 
procedural problems that litigants have faced in court because of judicial confusion over where such 
claims belong); Barbara Glesner Fines, Joinder of Tort Claims in Divorce Actions, 12 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW 285, 289 (1994) (same, concluding that voluntary joineder is most appropriate); 
Dalton, supra note 221, at 378. 
 223. See, e.g., Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979) (arguing that divorce and torts should be 
joined under a “single controversy” rule).  States have also made joinder mandatory on a case by case 
basis.  See Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482 (Ala. 1990); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
 224. See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 225. See, e.g., Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24 FAM. L.Q. 
127 (1990) (arguing for the propriety of mandatory joinder). 
 226. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2553 (“An abusive husband who stands to lose more of his 
property or pay mor support as a result of his past deeds may pull out more stops to keep her around.”). 
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from divorce 
all
reasoning should apply in family law and civil torts when different 
 
prevents victims from bringing domestic abuse torts when they are 
focused on extracting themselves from the marriage as quickly as 
possible.227  Distancing fault considerations in torts from the divorce 
process will promote the safety of the abused through timely legal 
separation, while still providing later financial recourse to the victim.228  
Litigating a tort for marital wrongdoing and separate 
ows the needed separation and quick escape from an abusive 
marriage.229 
Moreover, the need to join a spousal tort case with a divorce confuses 
what should be two very different processes with different goals.230  
Keeping the process of punishing culpable behavior and providing 
monetary recourse in tort will best allow judges to focus on what I argue 
should be the goal of divorce: ensuring adequate support of dependents 
of the marriage and optimizing post-divorce relations between parents 
and children.231  The subject matter of divorce and spousal torts is 
mostly different,232 and the goals are entirely different.  Simply because 
the spouses are married does not make all their interactions in need of 
judicial intervention appropriate for one court.  For instance, juries 
should be available for torts in a manner totally inappropriate in 
divorce.233  Criminal and civil proceedings that resolve the same 
disputes are separated because of different legal standards that apply and 
distinctive purposes of the criminal and civil system.234  This same 
 227. See Wriggins, supra note 200, at 155–56; Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 140–41 (2001) (arguing that bringing tort claims together with divorce claims can 
put the plaintiff’s economic or physical survival, or relationship with children at risk); Dalton, supra 
note 221, at 387. 
 228. Dalton, supra note 221, at 390. 
 229. Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1998). 
 230. See, e.g., Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d 909, 912 (N.H. 1987) (the purpose of divorce is to 
dissolve a marriage whereas the purpose of a tort suit is to compensate injuries); Heacock v. Heacock, 
520 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Mass. 1988). 
 231. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 232. Custody decisions would have to look at the conduct of the spouses to the extent the conduct 
harms the child.  See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), jurisdictional motion 
overruled by, 551 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1990); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1994) 
(threatening behavior, including threats of a hit man, significant enough to sustain IIED tort); Ward v. 
Ward, 583 A.2d 577, 581 (Vt. 1990). 
 234. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (finding the 
difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel since the acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented “an 
adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the 
accused”); State v. Enebak, 272 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn. 1978); see generally, Andrew Z. Glickman, Civil 
Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel 
Proceedings After U.S. v. Halper, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990). 
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 agreements.239  A release 
of a tort claim could be separately negotiated. 




purposes and goals are involved, particularly when fault is not even 
adjudicated in the divorce process.235  In fact, the lack of fault 
consideration in most divorce law makes joinder particularly 
inappropriate as discussion of abusive behavior could cloud the remedial 
purpose of the divorce process.236  Claim preclusion should not arise 
from settlement agreements in the divorce process either.237  Settlement 
agreements regularly purport to release all the parties from all “property 
rights” between them or “claims, rights and duties arising or growing out 
of said marital relationship”; torts do not arise from the marriage nor do 
they concern property rights.238  Preclusion of tort claims has been 
unjustifiably allowed based on such settlement
Reorienting the litigation of wrongdoing between spouses in the 
context of torts demands redefining what kind of wrongdoing is 
judiciable between spouses and when.  Therefore, this Article develops 
e particulars of spousal wrongs that should be considered spousal torts. 
First, as a precursor to the discussion of the nature of spousal torts, in 
the context of divorce, many, if not all, courts take into account the 
dissipation of assets in determining equitable property distribution.240  
This is the only wrongdoing that should appropriately remain in the 
divorce context.  Such economic fault seems eminently relevant in 
determining property distribution although other fault should not be 
considered.  Just as monetary contributions, debt, and child caregiving 
efforts are relevant for equitable distribution purposes, economic 
dissipation should be relevant too.  Such factors are all relevant for how 
the couples’ property at the end of marriage came into being and thus 
how it should be divided equitably.  If such dissipation is relevant in 
divorce, it should not be also recoverable as a tort to avoid doub
 235. See, e.g., Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing 
Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1253 (1994). 
 236. See Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602, 603–04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Glesner Fines, 
supra note 222, at 289. 
 237. See, e.g., Janet W. Steversen, Interspousal Tort Claims in a Divorce Action in Oregon, 31 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 757, 776–77 (1995). 
 238. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482, 483–85 (Ala. 1990); Overberg v. Lusby, 921 
F.2d 90, 91–92 (6th Cir. 1990); Slansky v. Slansky, 553 A.2d 152, 153–54 (Vt. 1988); Jackson v. Hall, 
460 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Ala. 1984). 
 239. Hall, 460 S.2d at 1292. 
 240. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; Krause, supra note 4, at 1364; Beltran v. Beltran, 
227 Cal. Rptr. 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Marriage of Foster, 227 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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rec
y such law could pass constitutional muster 
after Lawrence v. Texas.251 
overy.  In any event, it is not usually extraordinary and outrageous. 
Adultery, the most typical of grounds for divorce, by itself should not 
be grounds for spousal torts.241  Historically, the purpose of marriage 
was community building and the complete, life-long “channeling of 
sexual expression” into a monogamous relationship.242  Accordingly, 
children born out of wedlock were treated particularly harshly by the 
law as “bastards.”243  Yet, now, we do not treat children born out of 
wedlock as illegitimate and any such treatment has largely been deemed 
unconstitutional.244  Moreover, while adultery clearly is still frowned 
upon,245 and can have significant effects on people’s careers if they are 
in the public spotlight, it is also relatively common.246  It is not deemed 
a huge impingement on societal interests and is not punished with direct 
legal ramifications as it once was,247 particularly in the age of no-
fault.248  For instance, in some states an adulterer was legally prohibited 
from marrying his accomplice, but all such laws have since been 
repealed.249  Moreover, where adultery was once a breach of criminal 
law,250 it is doubtful that an
 
 241. Spaht, supra note 75, at 258. 
 242. Id.  See also supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
alph Calhoun Brashier, Half-Bloods, Inheritance, and Family, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 215, 
and sources that indicate that an overwhelming majority of Americans say that 
See id. (citing surveys that suggest high adultery rates); see also Carey & Parker-Pope, supra 
f Thomas Green in State v. Green, 
ic interest, punishment intended to protect the marital 
 destructive outside forces.”). 
 adultery, under the 
 243. Spaht, supra note 75, at 258. 
 244. See Levy v. La., 391 U.S. 68 (1968), remanded to sub nom., Levy v. State ex rel. Charity 
Hosp. of La. at New Orleans Bd. of Adm’rs, 216 So.2d 818 (La. 1968); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762 (1977); R
236 (2007). 
 245. See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save 
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 1046–47 (2001) (citing a 
number of surveys 
adultery is wrong). 
 246. 
note 159. 
 247. Unless the adultery occurs in the context of a religious (even if not state) marriage and the 
state chooses to pursue a polygamous offender.  See Katherine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 
20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 191 (1991) (discussing the prosecution o
2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820, on criminal polygamy charges). 
 248. Spaht, supra note 75, at 261 (“Even though the public continues to impose a legal obligation 
of fidelity upon the spouses in their personal relationship and permits an immediate divorce for the 
betrayed spouse, it has in every other respect withdrawn any punishment on behalf of society at large for 
conduct once considered violative of the publ
relationship from
 249. Id. 
 250. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 161 (2009) (“In case of divorce, on account of adultery, 
the guilty party can never hereafter contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in
penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy . . . .”). 
 251. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court’s reasoning would call into question the constitutionality of “criminal laws against fornication, 
bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity”); Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. 
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In fact, spouses themselves are often willing to overlook adultery and 
remain in their marriages.252  Although societal status no longer 
necessarily mandates that spouses stay in broken marriages, modern 
marriage—in accordance with the ideal of joining with one’s soul 
mate253—is more complex than just the context for monogamous sexual 
relations.  Marriage, in other words, is built on more than its sexual 
“essentials.”254  While infidelity is a common reason for divorce, 
surveys indicate that the majority of people, who know or have reason to 
know their spouse is cheating, remain married for years afterward.255 
Conduct that constitutes physical violence should be actionable as a 
battery or assault and perhaps facilitated through the use of continuous 
torts.256  Moreover, emotional distress claims can and should be brought 
as corollaries to physical torts.257  This must be the case even though 
physical abuse is not uncommon—society must deem such abuse to be 
an outrage.258 
The harder question regarding spousal torts is defining IIED beyond 
physical abuse.  The focus of IIED is the extreme and outrageous 
behavior,259 which is actionable only if it causes severe emotional 
distress.260  In all contexts, including between spouses, courts want to 
avoid being involved in litigating “meanness” that is not “outrageous” or 
“beyond the bounds of decency” and so look for abusive behavior that 
goes “beyond the normal ebb and flow of married life.”261  The behavior 
identified must be so outrageous that it “shocks the conscience.”262  As 
discussed above, adultery alone, given how unexceptional it has 
Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165 
(2006); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 
xt. 
pp. Div. 1995).  Further 
D. L. 
frequency of domestic 
00 (indicating that outrage is the most important element of the tort); Ellman, 
d Flow . . . Infliction 
stress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 397 (1995). 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 837 (2006). 
 252. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159. 
 253. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying te
 254. See infra note 326 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Carey & Parker-Pope, supra note 159. 
 256. See, e.g., Giovone v. Giovone, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. A
discussion of battered women’s syndrome is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 257. See, e.g., Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Me. 1993); see also Buel, supra note 
201, at 985–87; Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 M
REV. 183, 213–20 (1995) (citing a number of cases where IIED is allowed due to physical abuse). 
 258. See Weiner, supra note 257 at 220–25 (pointing to the relative 
violence and arguing for a per se “outrageous” standard for domestic violence). 
 259. See id. at 2
supra note 63, at 795. 
 260. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 261. See, e.g., Leornard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb an
of Emotional Di
 262. Id. 
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he 
ma
 prove intent by demonstrating either intentional or 
reckless behavior. 
a. Aggravated Adultery 
 
become,263 and how spouses themselves so often overlook it, would not 
qualify for the tort of intentional infliction of distress—it simply does 
not “shock the conscience.”264  In addition, because of the significant 
change in sexual norms in the contemporary era, traditional heartbalm 
torts, still available in a few states, would not be appropriate for 
litigation under this framework.265  Breaking a promise to marry, even if 
it led to sexual intercourse, causing single parenthood, or engaging in 
adultery are actions that by themselves are not outrageous, without other 
facts that might shock the conscience.  On the other hand, a wife’s 
repeated threats to hire a hit man to have her husband murdered266 and a 
wife’s knowing failure to inform her husband that a child during t
rriage was not his, have appropriately risen to the level of IIED.267 
In order to shed some light on the distinction between culpable 
behavior that is not tortious and extraordinary dignitary harms that are, 
this Article provides a few examples of what might be deemed 
outrageous behavior.  Of course, doctrinally, in order to recover, the 
spouse also must experience severe distress from such outrageous 
behavior and must
Under the theory expressed here, it has already been indicated that the 
run of the mill adulterer—however morally degenerate—could not be 
liable for IIED on that basis alone.  But, what about the adulterer who is 
 263. See supra notes 246–255 and accompanying text. 
 264. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 747 A.2d 617 (Md. 2000); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (eleven year adulterous affair not sufficiently outrageous); Poston v. Poston, 
436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).  Unless, however, the adulterous conduct was indeed beyond the 
ordinary “cheating” behavior and reached extraordinary heights.  See discussion of “aggravated 
adultery,” infra Part III.A.3.a. 
 265. Historically, American law provided recourse for deceptive and undesirable sexual activity in 
the form of heartbalm torts that provided recourse for a broken heart caused by sexual fraud.  See, e.g., 
Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1061 (2008).  The four torts 
referred to as heartbalm torts are: (1) alienation of affections (a third party causes estrangement between 
spouses); (2) criminal conversation (a third party’s adulterous relationship with a plaintiff’s wife, 
usually); (3) seduction (an unmarried woman’s father and the woman herself could make a claim for 
injury resulting from premarital sex or unwed motherhood); and (4) breach of marriage promise (a 
promise of future marriage induced a woman to engage in sexual behavior that she would not have but 
for the promise and expectation of marriage).  See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 245, at 1002–03. 
 266. Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. 1994).  See also Bozman v. Bozman, 
830 A.2d 450 (Md. 2003); Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (Wife permitted to 
recover against husband in IIED claim alleging that husband attempted to hire someone to murder her.). 
 267. Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), jurisdictional motion overruled 
by, 551 N.E.2d 1304 (Ohio 1990). 
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er abusive, justify a 
su
to articulate a precise standard, such 
outrageous facts are not particularly hard to conceive of and should be 
actionable as determined
separation,  during the marriage custodial rights are assumed rather 
later sued for sexual harassment or sexual assault by one of his 
attempted or actual mistresses?  Should he also be subject to suit for 
IIED by his wife if she can prove that he acted in order to cause her 
distress or was reckless in causing her distress?  Does the aggravated 
nature of the adultery being forced, or in some mann
it by the perpetrator’s wife as well?  It certainly adds another level of 
humiliation, but is it extraordinary and outrageous? 
On these facts alone, probably not because, if so, any married person 
subject to a sexual harassment or sexual assault suit would then be 
subject to a suit in tort by his or her spouse.  While having your spouse 
sued for sexual assault of another woman is not mundane, these facts 
alone in today’s litigious society are not extraordinary—particularly if 
the spouse is ultimately not convicted.  Yet, additional aggravating 
circumstances could make this situation clearly extraordinary.  Imagine 
the sexual assault claim is brought by the wife’s sister and the husband 
is convicted.  Imagine the assaulting spouse, who is eventually 
convicted, implicates the spouse in his activities by having her testify on 
his behalf or liquidating her resources.  What if the couple’s children 
were in the house when the assault occurred and the husband recklessly 
or even intentionally allowed them to view the assault?  Such facts start 
to reach a “shock to the conscience” level and become extraordinary, 
even if the wife would not be able to bring a criminal charge against her 
husband.268  Although it is difficult 
 by a jury. 
b. Aggravated Bullying 
A wife who mildly or moderately bullies her husband would also not 
be liable for IIED.  A wife who screams at her husband and throws him 
out of the house does not shock the conscience and should not be subject 
to a dignitary tort regardless of how mean she might be.  Yet, 
extraordinary circumstances are possible.  A wife might make her 
husband honestly fear for his life.  A wife who hides the couple’s 
children without allowing him access for an extended period of time and 
without serious provocation is acting outrageously.  While tort remedies 
are often available once custodial rights are assigned during divorce or 
269
 
 268. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. 
L. REV. 1268, 1337–42 (1996) (discussing an exception to their argument against emotional spousal 
ht against the spouse for actions to his/her spouse). abuse as a tort when a criminal case could be broug
 269. See Berger, supra note 203, at 501–02. 
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ions, or an education, may be subject to a 
di
tween strangers, should be sufficiently 
ou
 
than ordered making the availability of an IIED claim necessary.270  The 
bully spouse who does outlandish things in order to cause harm to her 
spouse, like threaten and interfere with a spouse’s close relationships 
and work situations causing serious struggle and disarray in a person’s 
life, might also be subject to a claim of IIED, depending on the specific 
circumstances.271  Similarly, a spouse who deprives his dependent 
spouse and/or children of the basic necessities of life, like food, 
acceptable living condit
gnitary tort as well.272 
The relevance of marriage to a finding of IIED is complex but 
ultimately discernible.273  The fact that the parties are married is relevant 
in considering the nature of the relationship and the impact the conduct 
would have on the plaintiff.  For instance, when a spouse rapes his 
wife’s sister, that the parties were married would impact a claim for 
IIED because of the conduct’s impact and level of outrageousness.  Yet, 
in determining outrageousness between spouses, the bullying standards 
should not be lower than between strangers because of the “trust” that 
has developed in a married couple because that level of trust is too 
subjective and outrageousness is objective.  Bullying conduct that would 
be “outrageous” enough be
trageous between spouses. 
Ultimately, the inquiry is extremely fact specific and jury dependent.  
IIED has been extremely hard to prove.  Thus, those worried that it will 
encompass too much marital behavior and be too much of an invasion 
on marital privacy would have to explain why it would be different than 
other contexts to which the tort has remained contained,274 and why it is 
different than physical abuse in which marital privacy has been 
rightfully dismissed as a reason not to adjudicate.  Just as in non-spousal 
IIED cases, as well as torts generally, there are bound to be 
 270. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (rejecting the tort of interference 
with custody as being contrary to the best interests of the children, but willing to consider an IIED action 
based on the same conduct if the latter is egregious); see also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of 
Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 67–68 (1993) (contrasting 
.2d 377 (S.D. 2001) (finding IIED where husband 
ter
n the doctrine of privacy where wife alleges husband withholds money and basic 
 Sugarman’s argument that as between 
ntified. 
claims for IIED with claims for interference with custodial rights). 
 271. See, e.g., Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W
in fered with employer in an outrageous manner). 
 272. One thing the seminal case of McGuire v. McGuire case teaches family law students is that a 
married couple can act horribly to each other within the context of an ongoing marriage McGuire v. 
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to enforce husband’s duty to provides necessaries to 
wife based o
provisions). 
 273. See infra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of Ellman and
spouses extraordinary conduct is too subjective to be ide
 274. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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ific, and it 
should not be context exclusive by excluding the marriage.276 
B. Advantages of Spousal Torts 
 Third, the power of torts 
should be wielded to counter gendered harms. 
1. Providing Monetary Redress for Domestic Abuse 
he societal consensus for the need to protect against 
do
 
inconsistencies between cases because judgments are jury dependent.275  
But that does not detract from the need for tortious recourse for serious 
emotional abuse.  What is “extreme and outrageous” is dependent on 
social norms and realities and is thus best left determined by juries in all 
contexts.  Such behavior should be punished through monetary rewards.  
IIED is an outlet for dignitary harms that is not context spec
The tort process, which is intended to deal with civil disputes 
assigning fault and blame, is the appropriate exclusive forum for 
contending with marital wrongs.  This subpart posits three reasons for 
promoting spousal torts.  First, torts provide monetary redress for 
extraordinary and outrageous harms between spouses that would be 
recoverable as between strangers.  Domestic abuse should not be 
privileged from litigation.  Second, a tort remedy is more appropriate 
given contemporary societal norms that support focus on protecting 
caregivers and children in the divorce process. 
Harms judiciable as between strangers should also be judiciable as 
between spouses.  Otherwise, domestic abuse is more protected from 
litigation than similar wrongs, which is discriminatory against women 
and contradicts t
mestic abuse. 
Primary caregivers, who are usually women, are more tied to home 
life because they spend more time caring for dependent children and 
spend more time working in the home, even if they also work in the 
marketplace.277  As discussed above, women are therefore 
disproportionately vulnerable to punishment under traditional concepts 
of marital fault by being denied property, alimony, and custody.278  
Moreover, women are more likely to be the abused party when domestic 
 275. Compare Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing recovery on 
spousal IIED claim) with Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (denying recovery). 
 276. See Buel, supra note 201, at 987. 
 277. See SPAIN & BIANCHI, supra note 17, at 167–76; HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 14 
(documenting the phenomena of the “second shift” whereby even women who work “full-time” do 
much more of the household work). 
 278. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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abuse occurs, and therefore need to be able to get out of the marriage as 
quickly as possible, without contending with difficult evidentiary issues 
of fault.279  Both these gendered arguments favor leaving fault out of 
divorce.  On the other hand, if serious wrongs mounting to the level of 
marital domestic physical or emotional abuse are not punished at all, it is 
women, who are usually the victims of serious physical and emotional 
abuse in the home that are left without recourse.  This is logical b
omen are both more present in and more dependent on the home and 
are more physically and emotionally vulnerable to such abuse.280 
It has been noted that, “[a]s feminists have demanded new protections 
for women in the public sphere, we [feminists] seem to have 
simultaneously acquiesced to a reductionist vision of moral 
responsibility in the domestic sphere.  Ironically, this is the sphere in 
which women are most at risk of economic, physical, and emotional 
injury.”281  In the workplace, in the criminal system, and in the context 
of domestic physical violence, feminists advocate recognition of 
women’s abuse.  If abuse occurs in the workplace, whether it is physical 
or emotional, the law addresses such abuse in the context of sexual 
harassment laws, criminal laws, or civil torts.  While emotional injury in 
the workplace, classified as sexual harassment, was originally 
prosecuted in order to assure workplace equality, justifications for 
sexual harassment have since been broadened.282  Instead, scholars 
argue that sexual harassment should be understood to inflict tortious 
dignitary harm, allowing sexual harassment in prisons, and other non-
workplace public settings.283  Criminal law and tort la
dresses physical or emotional abuse suffered by women in the public 
 
 279. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE 
PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000) (finding that in 2001, 85% of domestic violence victims were women); 
Merle H. Weiner, The Potential and Challenges of Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned 
About Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 786–87 (2003) 
(recognizing that governments usually do not interfere with domestic violence issues and therefore fail 
to protect women victims); Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 
1902, 1941 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2006), declared unconstitutional by United States 
v. Morrison, 120 U.S. 598 (2000)) (noting that victims of domestic violence are usually women); Ileana 
Arias et al., Violence Against Women: The State of Batterer Prevention Programs, 30 J.L. MED. & 
el, supra note 201, at 958, 962 (men are usually the perpetrators and initiators of 
l. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
 also Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
. 
ETHICS 157 (2002). 
 280. See Bu
domestic abuse). 
 281. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 2528. 
 282. Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment 
Protections for Non-Workplace Settings (U. of S. Ca
24, 2009), http://law.bepress.com/usclwps/lss/art24. 
 283. Id.  See
445, 487 (1997)
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a tort recovery in lieu of fault divorce; rather, it is merely 





sphere, whether in the workplace or other institutional setting.284 
Excluding dignitary harms inflicted in the home from tort law 
neglects a significant area of harm, which is usually suffered by women.  
In fact, any reason for such exclusion would be discriminatory against 
women—deeming domestic disputes too private, too emotional, and too 
subjective for judicial determination.285  Abuse usually suffered by 
women can be addressed through the civil arena of torts just as any 
personal injury claim can.286  Allowing a case for IIED between spouses 
is not injecting 
e state.287 
2. Redefining Marital Wrongdoing in a Contemporary Context 
Traditional fault grounds developed in a hierarchal society in which 
different gender roles for men and women were mandated.288  The 
nature of conduct necessitating serious legal punishment has 
transformed.  The analysis above, narrowing and reorienting marital 
wrongs in the contexts of torts, gives adjudication of marital wrongs a 
much needed update.289  Prosecuting instances of adultery and judicial 
resolution of heartbalm torts at one point reflected the core of marriage
d intimate relations,290 but judicial resolution is no longer appropriate 
in light of the self-fulfilling visions of marriage previously discussed.291 
Moreover, in accordance with contemporary societal mores, under 
which divorce should focus on the plight of caregivers and their 
dependents,292 tort law is a more suitable outlet for spousal wrongs.  
First, not all wrongdoing between spouses is judiciable; much of the 
 284. Id. 
 285. This critique will be taken up in more detail in infra Part III.C.1.  See Wriggins, supra note 
200, at 154; Reva B. Seigel, The Rule of Love, Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 
2117, 2119–20 (1996); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d. 619, 640–05 (Spector, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that both IIED and negligent infliction of emotional distress should be available as recourse against 
nly providing a remedy to an aggrieved 
arty he state.”). 
, at 1111–12. 
date notions of 
 note 75, at 258 (analyzing outdated notions of fault). 
spousal wrongdoing to recognize tortious harm women are more likely to experience). 
 286. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Wyo. 2001); Christians v. Christians, 637 N.W.2d 
377, 382 (stating that the court was not “injecting a tort recovery for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress” into every domestic suit, but rather, that it was “o
p  . . . available to every other citizen of t
 287. Christians, 637 N.W.2d at 377. 
 288. See Singer, supra note 6
 289. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 290. See supra notes 265–267 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra Part II.B.1; Krause, supra note 4, at 1365 (discussing the need to up
spousal wrongdoing); Spaht, supra
 292. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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t be questioned.   All 
in
harms are mutual accounts of resentment and pain that are better 
handled by a therapist than by a judge.293  Torts would not be available 
for all wrongdoing but only for physical abuse and extraordinary and 
outrageous intentional dignitary harms that cause severe distress.294  
Such torts make consideration of marital wrongdoing significantly less 
frequent than fault-driven divorce and fault-regarding divorce do.295  
Such a system may have been relevant where the state had a strong 
interest in keeping all marriages together, but not in light of more 
contemporary perspectives on marriage.296  In that way, the focus of 
divorce remains on caregivers and dependents and only in extreme cases 
are financial penalties levied on deserving wrongdoers in a separate suit 
in the context of torts.  Primary caregivers and the dependent children 
for whom they care, who are in need of support and should be protected 
by divorce laws, will only find themselves in financial ruin because of 
extreme and outrageous behavior on the part of a caregiver, in which 
case primary custody should in any even 297
dications are that spousal torts are and will continue to be relatively 
rare and saved for extreme circumstances.298 
As compared to fault-regarding divorce, tort law more fairly provides 
financial recourse to whichever spouse has suffered the physical or 
emotional abuse.  In divorce law, a determination of wrongdoing, 
particularly adultery, was traditionally used to bar, decrease, or 
completely discharge an obligation of alimony or, more recently, 
decrease the equitable share of property distribution.299  That financial 
support is usually paid by a primary earner to a primary caregiver.  If the 
primary caregiver is at fault, a reduction in the financial incidents of 
divorce punishes that caregiver for her wrongdoing by denying her this 
needed support.  If the higher earner is at fault, then he could be forced 
to pay more than an otherwise equitable share of his property and 
 
 293. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 294. See supra Part III.A. 
 295. See supra Part II.A. 
 296. See supra Part II.A.1, II.B.1; HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note 89, at 285–86 (arguing for a 
civil remedy as opposed to marital grounds remedy for marital wrongs because the injury of infidelity is 
one to the spouse and under current social mores, not a harm committed against the state; such a penalty 
should be in the form of property distribution “bonus” or a separate civil remedy); see also ALI 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 49–53. 
 297. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 298. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Singer, supra note 7, at 1461, 1474; Wardle, supra note 2, at 115 n.148 (Adoption of no-
fault divorce “has created significant problems for the justification of the imposition of any post-
dissolution continuing spousal support or sharing obligation.”); Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 
77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1989) (Modern divorce reform has completely undermined traditional 
justifications for alimony.); Ellman, supra note 63, at 787. 
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  Tort law can be punitive and can leave someone financially 
needy because of abusive behavior.  Divorce law should not leave 
anyone destitute— provide equitable 
relief.308 
determining social norms, and anytime women are disproportionately 
potentially higher alimony.  As discussed above, any such system has a 
greater impact on the caregiver who cannot rely on a continuing salary, 
and thus such punishment should only come in the wake of relatively 
rare, extraordinary abuse.300  Moreover, divorce rewards are an 
equitable system of property division and continuing support,301 which 
are potentially subject to later modification based on totally unrelated 
scenarios.302  There are many factors involved in determining divorce 
awards with the overriding goal being to support the separation of 
families and to provide a sustainable life for the divided family going 
forward.303  A change in alimony would still be in the context of issues 
beyond fault and would generally not “wipe out” one of the two 
parties.304  Alternately, tort law traditionally acts to reward the victim 
and not just reduce a financial obligation.305  A determination of serious 
wrongdoing should not only adjust equitable rewards but also have the 
potential to be a financial boon, with punitive damages potentially 
available.306  Behavior worthy of severe reprimand to the perpetrator 
and a financial windfall for the victim as between strangers should be 
similarly punished in the tort system as between spouses.  Personal 
injury law is applicable to separate property of the spouses if brought 
simultaneously and joined, or, in the preferred circumstances tort 
recovery after divorce, would apply to the spouse’s post-divorce 
property.307
it should separate families and 
3. Harnessing the Power of Torts 
Finally, it is crucial that feminists focus on the use of torts to redress 
wrongs that women suffer.309  Tort law is a central focal point for 
 
 300. See supra Part II.C.2 and note 209 and accompanying text. 
11. 
1, at 390. 
. 
 Policies, Procedures, 27 J. FAM. L. 489, 511 (1989). 
, Wriggins, supra note 200, at 140. 
 301. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 5
 302. See Dalton, supra note 22
 303. See supra Part II.A.1, 2. 
 304. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 60, at 511
 305. See Krause, supra note 4, at 1365–66. 
 306. See id.; Dalton, supra note 221, at 390. 
 307. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W. 2d 619, 625 n.20 (Tex. 1993); see also Barbara H. 
Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems,
 308. See Evans, supra note 4, at 491. 
 309. See, e.g.
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ines that affect 
women, torts can contend with gender in a generalized manner because 
it redresses all w
 
harmed, that should be integrated into the tort system.310  The failure to 
recognize certain torts and defining the parameters of tort have gendered 
implications.311  It is problematic for domestic abuse to be separated 
from other physically and emotional abusive behavior as “relationship 
trouble” and not be part of the general social fabric of wrongs that need 
recourse.312  Unlike in areas of constitutional law, criminal law, or 
family law, where women’s issues are a specialized subset of those legal 
systems, torts mainstreams the issue into a “decentralized, egalitarian 
decision-making system—the jury.”313  Such mainstreaming allows 
women to feel that their particular experiences and complaints are 
worthy of attention as part of critical tort doctrines—they do not need to 
be separated out or put in parentheses.314  Moreover, tort law is not 
fraught with the hierarchal history of family law.315  Unlike 
constitutional law and employment law that deal with discrimination and 
stereotyping, or family law that deals with special doctr
rongs that are suffered by an individual. 
C. Addressing Critiques of Spousal Torts 
1. Spousal Torts Are Too Intimate To Be Objectively Adjudicated 
In an influential article,316 Ira Ellman and Stephen Sugarman argue 
that although physical violence between spouses should be subject to 
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. at 142. 
 312. See Buel, supra note 201, at 976. 
 313. Wriggins, supra note 200, at 140. 
 314. Regina Austin, Super Size Me and the Conundrum of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Class for 
the Contemporary Law-Genre Documentary Filmmaker, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 687, 713 (2007); Lucinda 
M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 41, 43 (1989) (“Acknowledgment of gender issues in torts can help women feel less like 
outsiders to the enterprise of the law, and may encourage them to engage in open dialogue, to bring up 
their experiences, to scrutinize the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of various legal rules, and to raise 
HE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF 
IVO
vely elsewhere (according to a Westlaw search 
previously unraised questions.”). 
 315. See, e.g., COTT, supra note 111, at 7 (“A man’s headship of a family, his taking the 
responsibility for dependent wife and children, qualified him to be a participating member of a state.”); 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 
(2004); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, T
D RCE REFORM 1–13, 17–35 (1991). 
 316. Excerpts of the article have been included and the article itself cited in numerous family 
casebooks, see, for example, JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW CASES AND 
MATERIALS (2006) and HARRY D. KRAUSE ET. AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
QUESTIONS (2004), and the article has been cited extensi
it has been cited in 41 law review articles and treatises). 
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 diverse to be subject to an objective 
sc
rried lovers, or 
be
where the goal is expressly to give redress to the abused spouse, the 
emotional nature of the relationship should have even less influence than 
tort suits, emotional abuse generally should not.317  They contend that 
determining “extreme and outrageous” conduct between married 
couples—one of the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress—is not a judicially determinable concept because of 
the subjective nature of marital relations.318  They argue that marital 
relations are too personal and
rutiny of conduct that is “outrageous.”319  Instead they argue that only 
behavior that would be considered criminal toward the spouse should be 
actionable in a tort of IIED.320 
But what makes marital relations so different from other subjective 
and personal relationships?  There are many complex and even intimate 
relationships that are subject to tortious recovery for emotional abuse: 
workplace relations, institutional relations such as prisoners and prison 
guards,321 student-teacher relations and/or relations between congregants 
and pastors or patients and doctors/psychologists, non-ma
st-friends.  Such relations can be just as complicated and difficult to 
scrutinize objectively.  Thus, excluding only married couples from the 
possibility of emotional torts must be carefully justified. 
One difference is the emotional nature of the marital relations, which 
are intended to be more love-based and emotive than workplace 
relations (though not necessarily different than non-married couples).322  
Yet, in other legal contexts the emotional nature of the relations has not 
justified exemptions from legal recourse.  For instance, in contracts 
between spouses, society has not credited the emotional nature of the 
relations with sufficient weight to reject the enforceability of spousal 
contracts,323 although some states insist on some protective measures 
before enforcing spousal contracts to protect the spouse who is less 
informed, less powerful, or has more to lose.324  In the context of torts, 
 
 317. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 268, at 1317–26, 1340–42. 
 318. Id. at 1318. (citing Massey v. Massey, 801 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tx. Ct. App. 2001) (“The 
ncy vary from legal relationship to legal relationship.  The marital relationship is highly 
ubj y mutual understandings and interchanges which are constantly in flux, and 
 some segments of society as outrageous.”). 
eone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (treating contracts between spouses in the 
bounds of dece
s ective and constituted b
any number of which can be viewed by
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 1337–42. 
 321. See Rich, supra note 282. 
 322. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324–25 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
 323. See Simeone v. Sim
same manner as contracts between strangers). 
 324. See, e.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990); UNIF. PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1984). 
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sensitivity to the real harms that 
ca
in contracts.325  Moreover, in the context of rape, which is intimately 
interconnected with the sexual “essentials” of marriage,326 the subjective 
and complicated nature of the relations continues to have some effect on 
the ease of prosecutions, but the effect is waning.327  While the claim of 
marital rape used to be completely unavailable, it is gaining in 
acceptance.328  In fact, with regard to civil or criminal orders of 
protection, the emotional nature of the relations has afforded greater, 
more specialized attention.329  Accordingly, the emotional nature of 
marital relations should not exclude adjudication of abuse between 
spouses; rather, as in other areas of law, 
n be suffered must be acknowledged. 
Another difference between spousal torts and other dignitary harms is 
whether they occur in the public or private sphere—in the home or 
outside it.330  Keeping the private sphere out of torts has been squarely 
rejected when the abuse is physical and should be similarly rejected with 
regard to emotional abuse.331  Privacy infamously has been used as a 
cloak for hiding paternalistic sentiments in which men are deemed rulers 
of their households making public scrutiny inappropriate.332  For 
instance, in Hakkila v. Hakkila, the court found that identifying blatantly 
 
 325.
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1516–18 (1983) (describing the move of the law back into the family life in order 
16 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004) (disallowing annulment based on 
ay, supra note 213, 1482–523. 
 the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS 
e 
riva
 the ground that he 
ow  at 975. 
 See Fraces E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
to redress issues of inequality and abuse). 
 326. The “essentials” of marriage is a term coined in the context of determining what constitutes 
fraud in entering a marriage agreement.  Traditional case law, which is still applicable in most 
jurisdictions, only accepts fraud claims based on deceit or trickery regarding an essential or “sexual” 
element of the marriage, such as infertility, impotence, virginity, pregnancy, possession of venereal 
diseases, etc.  See, e.g., Johnston v. Johnston, 18 Cal.App.4th 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding 
husband’s lazy, unshaven, and drunk behavior insufficient to prove fraud); Stepp v. Stepp, No. 
03CA0052-M, 2004 WL 6261
fraudulent portrayal of assets). 
 327. See Hasd
 328. Id. 
 329. See, e.g., Judith Smith, Battered Wives and Unequal Protective-Order Coverage: A Call for 
Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 105–08 (2005); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We 
Know that For Sure? Questioning
U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2004). 
 330. See Weiner, supra note 257, at 207–08. 
 331. See Olsen, supra note 325, at 1498–501 (describing the legal perspective of the family as th
p te, altruistic female realm as opposed to the market which is the public, male productive sphere). 
 332. For an examples of a historic case in which horrendous abuse is rejected in the context of 
marriage due to concerns for the privacy of the couple, see Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 305–09 (Me. 
1877) (entering a nonsuit against the former wife where her ex-husband with friends forcibly kidnapped 
her and had her institutionalized in a mental institution), overruled by Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 
1135 (Me. 1993).  See also Seaquist & Kelley, supra note 203, at 31; Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 
210 (N.C. 1920) (“Whenever a man has laid open his wife’s head with a bludgeon, put out her eye, 
broken her arm, or poisoned her body, he is no longer exempt from liability to her on
v ed at the altar to ‘love, cherish, and protect’ her.”); Buel, supra note 201,
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 outrageous is a very difficult inquiry in any 




abusive behavior, including physical abuse, as “beyond our capacity” 
because of the regular abuse that occurs within many marriages.333  This 
kind of reasoning must be rejected; it is deeply prejudicial to victims of 
marital abuse.  Behavior that meets the high standards for IIED—that 
“shocks the conscience”—does so within the marital context as well.  
Although it is argued that some spouses are simply used to being mean 
to one another, conduct that rises to the level of abuse, that is 
“extraordinary,” should not be protected because it occurs within a 
marriage.  Even (or especially) within a marriage, behavior that a jury 
objectively determines to be objectively emotionally abusive should be 
subject to societal condemnation through torts.  Ultimately, determining 
what conduct is extreme and
334
oo in the context of marital relations, the outrageous emotional abuse
ld be identified.336 
2. Spousal Torts Will Create Even More Acrimony than Fault Divorce 
Despite his belief in the continuing relevance of fault in marital 
relations at the time of divorce, Harry Krause argues forcefully against 
allowing fault during marriage to pervade the area of tort litigation 
because “tort law will reintroduce to the end of marriage more and 
worse acrimony than no-fault divorce ever eliminated.”337  But why 
should that be?  If the divorce is already procured, custody and support 
issues already determined the dispute becomes a purely financial one, 
like any other tort.  Logically, the acrimony should be lessened as 
compared to fault divorce, not elevated.  The longer process for recovery 
in torts than there should be for obtaining a divorce should provide 
distance from the wrongful act, assuming legal doctrines such as res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are not improperly used to prevent 
bringing the tort after the divorce.338  Moreover, the parties will have 
 333. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). 
 334. See, e.g., Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No Longer Following the Rule of Thumb—What To Do 
w recognize and adjudicate the tort of IIED.  See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
AW
her discussion of what outrageous behavior would look like in the marital context, 
 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), a tort might be filed earlier than a divorce for strategic 
with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 931. 
 335. All jurisdictions no
L  OF TORTS 1247 (2000). 
 336. For furt
see supra III.A.3. 
 337. Krause, supra note 4, at 1364. 
 338. See supra notes 222–237 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Dalton, supra note 221, at 386 
(arguing that if abused spouses can escape procedural hurdles, “later is better”).  Alternately, in a rare 
case, a tort might be filed prior to divorce.  Although statute of limitations problems could be addressed 
through allowing continuous torts of domestic violence or abuse, see, for example, Giovine v. Giovine, 
663 A.2d
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ies for 
fault-driven or fault-regarding divorce.  Yet the potential for such torts 
and th t and 
appropriate when the fac
eflecting the very 
na
 abuse by discouraging it.   Abusive outrageous conduct 
is harmful even in the context of a problematically co-dependent 
relationship, a es are active 
participants. 
 
had recourse to the divorce process to separate from the marriage and 
move on with their lives without an accusatory component.  Indeed, as 
indicated above, these torts should be much rarer than fault inquir
e availability of recourse apart from marriage is significan
tual basis for a tort of IIED is present.339 
3. Spousal Torts Ignore the Complexity of Marital Relations 
Queer theorists have argued that sexual aggression and sexual 
deviance, such as encountered in the facts of Twyman, is overly 
condemned due to undue hostility toward sex and sexual deviance as 
well as the over-privileging of the social norms of monogamy.340  It is 
more accurate, according to Halley, to view the Twymans as willing 
participants in the sexual deviance—it is Sheila Twyman’s role to be the 
victim and the husband’s to be the dominator and both engage in such 
domination willingly.341  In other words, the sexual or even non-sexual 
abuse is both desired by and abhorred by the victim r
ture of the marital relationship such that punishing these complex 
interactions is inappropriate, particularly in the marital framework where 
a long-term structure for these interactions is in place. 
Minimizing sexual and abusive harms by alleging enjoyment of the 
abuse or equal power when engaging in it such that there is no one 
victim, ignores how men and women indicate they have experienced 
these harms.342  Moreover, whatever enjoyment people are experiencing 
from abusive subordinating relations, society has a right to protect its 
citizens from 343
s Halley describes, where both parti
reasons. 
 339. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the necessary factual claims for IIED. 
 340. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 
193–98 (2003); Janet Halley et al., Gender Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 615–18 (2003). 
 341. Halley et al., supra note 340, at 615–18. 
 342. See, e.g., Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2006). 
 343. For instance, Michel Foucalt, upon whom Janet Halley relies in exploring queer theory, also 
questions the advisability of perusing sexual abuse against children because in part a child may enjoy the 
abuse.  See MICHEL FOUCALT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 
204–05 (1988).  Regulations and torts that frown upon morally problematic abusive behavior are 
justifiable on these grounds alone.  See West, supra note 342. 
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 with full costs, but they could be open to 
contingency arrangements for those ot otherwise afford to 
bring such a suit.347 
 
4. Spousal Torts are Prohibitively Costly 
Others argue that separating torts from divorce is prohibitively 
costly.344  On the one hand, all litigation is costly and so bringing a 
separate suit would logically increase costs.345  On the other hand, if all 
issues of blame and fault are removed from the divorce process and the 
focus is only on devising a sustainable, fair, and appropriate custody and 
financial settlement intended to optimize what is always a difficult 
situation, divorce would include significantly less litigation, thereby 
reducing its cost.  Mediation, collaborative lawyering, negotiated 
settlements, and family counseling would become even more central to 
the process.346  It is true that in a fault-driven or fault-regarding divorce 
system, two suits would be costly and wasteful.  But, the hope is that a 
true no-fault divorce would be quicker and cheaper.  Torts, on the other 
hand, are full litigations
who could n
IV. CONCLUSION 
This analysis makes the case for the use of torts as opposed to the 
divorce process to contend with marital wrongdoing.  Indeed, fault 
should be completely irrelevant in divorce and spousal torts a well-
defined remedy in tort law.  This analysis takes seriously the needs of 
dependents and their caregivers who it is argued should be the central 
concern of divorce law and who have the most to lose from the divorce 
process.  In fact, because spousal support should be based on needed 
support for caretaking functions engaged in by primary caregivers, fault 
should not be part of the support or property distribution formula.348  In 
addition, caregivers, who spend more time in the domestic sphere, 
should receive the protection in torts that women do in the workplace 
and as between strangers—a remedy for physical and severe emotional 
 344. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 
316 (1997); Evans, supra note 4, at 495–97. 
 345. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1498, 1532–33 (1993) (recognizing the practical limitations of tort suits to remedy situations of marital 
abuse). 
 346. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 347. See Buel, supra note 201, at 951–53 (commenting that many attorneys falsely believe that 
such suits are not worth bringing because defendant’s are likely to be lower income—but in fact 
violence occurs among all financial strata at equal rates).  But see Wilson, supra note 60, at 506 (arguing 
that lawyers are unlikely to take marital torts on a contingency basis in most cases). 
 348. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 15, at 56–65. 
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 caregivers in need of financial support.  In such cases of 
ph
le will have a reassuring effect on spouses in general.  
Nonetheless, some tension would have to be appropriately healed not 
through the law, but by time and other social resources not related to 
litigation. 
abuse.  Torts present a powerful means of seeking redress while still 
allowing those who need to escape the marriage because of serious 
abuse to do so as quickly as possible.  Only in rare, extraordinary, and 
shocking circumstances should spousal wrongdoings affect post-divorce 
lives of
ysical and outrageous emotional abuse, financial ruin may befall the 
perpetrator of the tort, but in such limited instances financial retribution 
is just. 
Moreover, extracting fault from divorce, yet preserving the relevance 
of physical and emotional abuse in the context of torts, will preserve the 
persistent experiential relevance of serious marital wrongdoing while 
allowing the divorce process to be reparative and focus on the ongoing 
relationships that are necessitated by children.  It is true that such 
spousal torts will be relatively rare and thus not release all the tension 
between spouses.  Yet, it is hoped that knowing that serious abuse torts 
are availab
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